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Google’s Law 
Greg Lastowka† 
[We] expect that advertising funded search engines will be inher-
ently biased towards the advertisers and away from the needs of the 
consumers . . . .  
— Sergey Brin and Larry Page1 
The economic success we continue to enjoy is the direct result of our 
ability to marry our user experience to the information that 
advertisers want to communicate.  
— Larry Page2 
INTRODUCTION 
Google has become, for the majority of Americans, the 
index of choice for online information.3 Through dynamically 
generated results keyed to a near-infinite variety of search 
terms, Google steers our thoughts and our learning online. It 
tells us what words mean, what things look like, where to buy 
things, and who and what is most important to us. Google’s 
control over search results constitutes an awesome ability to 
  
 † Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law—Camden. Early ver-
sions of this research were presented in 2007 at the University of Michigan School of 
Law, the annual conference of the National Communication Association, and the 
Rutgers Center for Cultural Analysis. I would like to thank James Grimmelmann, Dan 
Hunter, Michael Kwun, Jessica Litman, Meredith McGill, Frank Pasquale, and Siva 
Vaidhyanathan for helpful conversations about Google and search. Special thanks go to 
Eric Goldman for extensive and invaluable feedback. Thanks also go to my research 
assistants Candy Dougherty, Gus Sara, and Sidharth Uberoi for their diligent help. 
The editors of the Brooklyn Law Review did wonderful work and improved the Article 
substantially. Finally, I am grateful to Rutgers School of Law—Camden for providing 
generous summer research support for this project. 
 1 Sergey Brin & Larry Page, The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual 
Web Search Engine, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 7TH INTERNATIONAL WORLD WIDE WEB 
CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER NETWORKS (1998), available at http://www7.scu.edu.au/ 
1921/com1921.htm. 
 2 Google Q3 2006 Earnings Call Transcript (Oct. 19, 2006), http:// 
seekingalpha.com/article/18858-google-q3-2006-earnings-call-transcript. 
 3 Who’s Afraid of Google?, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 30, 2007 (noting that there 
are other major search engines, “[b]ut Google, through the sheer speed with which it 
accumulates the treasure of information, will be the one to test the limits of what 
society can tolerate”). 
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set the course of human knowledge.4 It is not surprising that 
the commercial exploitation of results is also the primary 
source of Google’s wealth. 
As this Article will explain, fortunes are won and lost 
based on Google’s results pages, including the fortunes of 
Google itself.5 Because Google’s results are so significant to 
e-commerce activities today, they have already been the subject 
of substantial litigation.6 Today’s courtroom disputes over 
Google’s results are based primarily, though not exclusively, in 
claims about the requirements of trademark law. This Article 
will argue that the most powerful trademark doctrines shaping 
these cases, “initial interest confusion” and “trademark use,” 
are not up to the task they have been given, but that trade-
mark law must continue to stay engaged with Google’s results.  
The current application of initial interest confusion to 
search results represents a hyper-extension of trademark law 
past the point of its traditional basis in preventing consumer 
confusion. Courts should reject the initial interest confusion 
doctrine due to its tendency to grant trademark owners rights 
over search results that could easily operate against the 
greater public interest.7  
On the other hand, the recent innovation of the trade-
mark use doctrine improperly relieves trademark law of any 
role in the supervision of Google’s search results. While the law 
should be cautious in how it regulates new technologies such as 
  
 4 Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web: Why the Politics 
of Search Engines Matters, 16 INFO SOC’Y 3 (2000), available at http://www.nyu.edu/ 
projects/nissenbaum/papers/searchengines.pdf; Google Inc., Letter from the Founders: 
“An Owner’s Manual” for Google’s Shareholders, in Forms S-1 Registration Statement 
Under the Securities Act of 1933, at vi (filed with the SEC on Apr. 29, 2004) 
[hereinafter Google Owner’s Manual]), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/1288776/000119312504073639/ds1.htm (“Google users trust our systems to 
help them with important decisions: medical, financial and many others.”). 
 5 Who’s Afraid of Google?, supra note 3 (“Many small firms hate Google 
because they relied on exploiting its search formulas to win prime positions in its 
rankings, but dropped to the internet’s equivalent of Hades after Google tweaked these 
algorithms.”). 
 6 See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393 (N.D.N.Y. 
2006); 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273 (D.N.J. 2006); Gov’t 
Employees Ins. Co. (“GEICO”) v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004). All 
three of these suits involved plaintiffs complaining about the appearance of competitor 
advertisements in search results. 
 7 I have argued this point before in F. Gregory Lastowka, Search Engines, 
HTML, and Trademarks: What’s the Meta for?, 86 VA. L. REV. 835, 857-58, 877 (2000) 
(arguing against the extension of initial interest confusion doctrine to search results).  
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Google,8 as Justice Cardozo once noted, major technological 
changes often call for the transformation of law.9 Where new 
technologies threaten new harms to society, the law must 
respond. As will be explained below, trademark law should 
retain its ability to confront, with common law flexibility, the 
abuse of power in Google’s results.  
If, as Lawrence Lessig has argued, computer code has a 
regulatory force tantamount to law,10 the absence of any state 
involvement in the shape of Google’s results will effectively 
cede the structure of our primary online index to “Google’s law.” 
Given Google’s meteoric rise to prominence and its current role 
as our primary online index, the law should be vigilant. Google 
may enjoy substantial public goodwill, but what is best for 
Google will not always be what is best for society.11  
Part I of this Article describes the history of Google and 
its business model. Google is not the only search engine today, 
but it is the leading search engine in terms of United States 
market share.12 Additionally, Google is playing the most impor-
tant role today in search engine litigation. It is a unique search 
engine in many respects. During its evolution, Google followed 
a very different path than many of its competitors. Today its 
competitors are largely imitating its model, yet are unable to 
dethrone its centrality in search. Understanding how Google 
rose to prominence is essential to understanding its motives 
and how it might act in the future. 
Part II of this Article sets forth the contemporary law 
pertaining to search results. It begins with a short discussion of 
recent (failed) attempts to regulate Google’s results through 
laws other than trademark. It then describes current theories 
of trademark law and summarizes how this law has been 
applied to search engines. It begins with early “meta tag” cases 
  
 8 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 
949-66 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (explaining “the limitations facing judges where 
matters of technology are concerned”). 
 9 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 62 (1921) 
(“[T]he great inventions . . . have built up new customs and new law.”). 
 10 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 3-8 (1999). 
 11 Who’s Afraid of Google?, supra note 3 (“Pretending that, just because your 
founders are nice young men and you give away lots of services, society has no right to 
question your motives no longer seems sensible.”). 
 12 Elise Ackerman, Google Gains Search Market Share, SAN JOSE MERCURY 
NEWS, Mar. 20, 2008 (“According to the Chicago-based research firm, [the Google Click 
for Enhanced Coverage Linking Searches] share of core searches jumped from 58.5 
percent to 59.2 percent . . . .”). 
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and concludes with Google’s current attempts to insulate itself 
from liability under an expanded doctrine of trademark use. 
Part III criticizes the current application of trademark 
law to search engines. It argues that the judicial innovations of 
both initial interest confusion and trademark use are incon-
sistent with the traditional purpose of trademark law and the 
new realities of the e-commerce marketplace. A simple focus  
on the likelihood of confusion standard, which some courts 
have already supported, is overdue. The Article concludes by 
explaining why, despite the fact that trademark law today will 
likely permit Google’s current practices, Google’s bid for the 
carte blanche freedom permitted by the trademark use doctrine 
should be rejected by courts. In its relatively new role as a 
protector of the social value of indices, trademark law must 
retain the ability to curb potential abuses of the commercial 
power enjoyed by Google.  
I. GOOGLE 
I may use [Google] to check the spelling of a foreign name, to acquire 
an image of a particular piece of military hardware, to find the exact 
quote of a public figure, check a stat, translate a phrase, or research 
the background of a particular corporation.  
— Garry Trudeau13 
For the majority of the United States population, Google 
currently functions as the central Web index. The verb “to 
Google” is often understood to mean “to search for information 
on the Web.”14 Google’s popularity has also made it mind-
bogglingly wealthy. In the summer of 2007, only three years 
after its IPO and nine years after its incorporation, Google was 
valued at over $160 billion dollars (greater than the $65 billion 
value of Disney and the $71 billion value of Time-Warner 
combined).15 
Google’s founders, Sergey Brin and Larry Page, were 
typical graduate students ten years ago and today are multi-
  
 13 AMY N. LANGVILLE & CARL D. MEYER, GOOGLE’S PAGERANK AND BEYOND: 
THE SCIENCE OF SEARCH ENGINE RANKINGS 4 (2006). 
 14 This makes Google’s trademark lawyers concerned about “genericide.” See 
Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1839-40 n.234 (2007).  
 15 See Google Finance, Aug. 31, 2007, http://finance.google.com/finance?q= 
GOOG+DIS+TWX.  
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billionaires.16 At work on Google’s California campus are at 
least 700 newly minted multi-millionaires in the company’s 
employ.17 Even the name “Google” has become a form of wealth. 
According to one study, the Google brand, which has grown 
with hardly any traditional media advertising, is worth over 
$60 billion and has displaced Coca-Cola to become the most 
recognized trademark in the world.18  
How did Google become so wealthy? In short, by selling 
advertisements. Over ninety-nine percent of the company’s 
revenues come from Google’s sale of advertising.19 Considering 
the history of Google, this seems like a very strange state of 
affairs. As the quote from Google’s founders at the start of this 
Article demonstrates, Brin and Page were once convinced that 
advertising should play no part in Google’s business model. 
They believed that a search engine funded by advertisers 
would be “inherently biased towards the advertisers and away 
from the needs of the consumers.”20 Google was created to fulfill 
a need for a search engine that was “transparent and in the 
academic realm.”21  
Yet, as will be explained, despite receiving all its reve-
nues from an influence they feared offered only contamination, 
Google is still guided (perhaps haunted?) by an anti-advertising 
ethos. The company’s informal corporate motto “Don’t Be Evil”22 
may be viewed as naïve for a corporation, but Google’s 
unconventional public statements suggest that its founders 
still believe that part of what makes Google so special is its 
refusal to condone “bias.” According to the company’s website: 
“Google’s mission is to organize the world’s information and 
make it universally accessible and useful.”23 Google’s 2004  
SEC filing in advance of its IPO included a “letter from the 
founders” to prospective stockholders that began: 
  
 16 More specifically, they are billionaires who roam the world in a Boeing 767 
with a custom couch. Verne Kopytoff, Luxury Jet Lands in Court; Formica Forbidden 
on Googlers’ Plane, Lawsuit Reveals, S.F. CHRON., July 11, 2006, at C1. 
 17 Quentin Hardy, Close to the Vest, FORBES, July 2, 2007, at 40. 
 18 Gemma Simpson, Google Beats Microsoft, Coke in Brand Stakes, CNET 
NEWS, Apr. 23, 2007, http://news.com.com/2100-1014_3-6178310.html. 
 19 Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10K), at 43 (Mar. 1, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312507044494/d10k.htm. 
 20 Brin & Page, supra note 1. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Google, Investor Relations: Google Code of Conduct, http://investor.google 
.com/conduct.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2008). 
 23 Google, Corporate Information: Company Overview, http://www.google.com/ 
intl/en/corporate/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2008). 
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Google is not a conventional company. We do not intend to become 
one. Throughout Google’s evolution as a privately held company, we 
have managed Google differently. We have also emphasized an 
atmosphere of creativity and challenge, which has helped us provide 
unbiased, accurate and free access to information for those who rely 
on us around the world.24  
Google thus presents a fascinating contradiction between its 
profit model and its self-conception. It claims an unconven-
tional interest in providing the world with “unbiased, accurate 
and free” information, yet it also generates billions of dollars a 
year in corporate wealth almost exclusively through exposing 
the world to paid advertisements. Making this apparent 
contradiction more interesting is the fact that Google is the 
central player in contemporary litigation over what search 
engines may and may not do. In this litigation, Google often 
seeks to cast itself as a defender of public values combating the 
overreaching claims of intellectual property owners.25  
A. Before Google 
Since its earliest inception, the Internet has been a 
means of storing and sharing large amounts of data. However, 
reams of information devoid of an organizing indexical scheme 
can be useless for all practical purposes. The same is true with 
the digital files on the Internet, which are made even more 
difficult to index by their scattered and anarchic mode of 
production and hosting.26 Providing a reliable and useful public 
index to the data on the Internet has long been a problem. 
Internet search, however, is a relatively new develop-
ment. For the first 20 years or so of the Internet’s history, there 
were no search engines of the sort we know today. ARPANET, 
the original network that evolved into the Internet, was 
created by the funding of the United States military in the late 
1960s.27 During the 1970s and 1980s, ARPANET grew in size 
  
 24 Google Owner’s Manual, supra note 4, at i (emphasis added). 
 25 For instance, see Google’s response to a lawsuit filed by the Author’s Guild 
against its book search service. Susan Wojcicki, Google Print and the Authors Guild, 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2005/09/google-print-and-authors-guild.html (“We regret 
that this group chose to sue us over a program that will make millions of books more 
discoverable to the world—especially since any copyright holder can exclude their 
books from the program.”). 
 26 See Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 951, 1004-06 (2004). 
 27 See generally KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP 
LATE (1996) (recounting the history of the Internet). 
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and merged with similarly structured decentralized computer 
networks. The end of all these mergers is the Internet: a great 
decentralized, worldwide network of networks organized 
around a common communications protocol.28 
There were already over 1000 Internet hosts as early as 
1984, yet there were no automated search and retrieval 
programs that facilitated access to the files on these systems.29 
Although e-mail usage and online bulletin boards were popular 
in the 1980s, there were no tools that could be used to browse 
the totality of the network. The problem was not with 
understanding the concept of search. Computer programmers 
were well acquainted with retrieving data in response to 
queries. The Unix “grep” command, for instance, was (and is) a 
common means of finding lines in data files that matched 
targeted text strings.30 Other Unix commands, like “finger,” 
were (and are) used to query networked systems for informa-
tion.31 Yet it was not until 1989 that the Internet’s first true 
search engine was created, “Archie.”32  
Archie was a software tool that stored monthly indices 
of the many files that were made available for public access on 
the Internet.33 Archie used a Unix-derived interface that was 
challenging to non-programmers and required users to run a 
separate retrieval program (file-transfer protocol (“FTP”)) to 
obtain files.34 Yet Archie was a revolution. For the first time, 
the Internet community could see much of its own information. 
Soon, multiple hosts were using the Archie software to index 
and search for hosted files.35 
  
 28 Id. at 246-56 (explaining the origins and growth of the TCP/IP protocol). 
 29 J.R. OKIN, THE INTERNET REVOLUTION: THE NOT-FOR-DUMMIES GUIDE TO 
THE HISTORY, TECHNOLOGY, AND USE OF THE INTERNET 323 (2005). 
 30 JERRY PEEK ET AL., LEARNING THE UNIX OPERATING SYSTEM 93 (5th ed. 
2002) (describing the “grep” command). 
 31 ARNOLD ROBBINS, UNIX IN A NUTSHELL 91 (2005) (describing the “finger” 
command). 
 32 Archie was the result of efforts by a group at McGill University in Canada. 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SIGNPOSTS IN CYBERSPACE: THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM 
AND INTERNET NAVIGATION 296 (2005) (explaining the origins and technology of 
Archie); Shea ex rel. American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 928 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (“To locate files available for copying, a user can contact an “Archie” server—a 
remote computer capable of searching directories for file names containing a particular 
string of characters on FTP servers permitting anonymous retrieval.”). 
 33 REGIS J. (BUD) BATES, BROADBAND TELECOMMUNICATIONS HANDBOOK 651 
(2d ed. 2002). 
 34 Id. 
 35 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 32, at 296. 
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Archie was quickly surpassed, however, by the World 
Wide Web. There were only 26 Web servers in 1992, but by 
1996 the number had grown to over 340,000.36 (Today there  
are over 90 million websites.37) By 1995, Web traffic had 
surpassed FTP traffic.38 The Web took file sharing a quantum 
leap forward by providing authors with a simple scripting 
language (HTML) and readers with a universal retrieval appli-
cation (the browser) that could piece together text, graphics, 
and other files, while allowing seamless cross-server navigation 
via hyperlinks. 
Early Web search engines took almost no time to arise. 
Modeled after Archie, they combed all publicly accessible Web 
servers, indexed their contents, and allowed users to search for 
targeted words and phrases. Companies such as Lycos (1994), 
Webcrawler (1994), Yahoo! (1994), Excite (1995), AltaVista 
(1995), Infoseek (1995), and Magellan (1995) became the new 
hubs of the Internet.39 
B. Google’s Business 
In 1997, Google founders Sergey Brin and Larry Page 
were graduate computer science students at Stanford. They 
wanted to build a search engine. To many observers, the 
project must have appeared naïve and quaint. Brin and Page 
came at least three years late to the search engine game. They 
had no funding to purchase hardware.40 And more importantly, 
  
 36 See Mark Ward, Fifteen Years of the Web, BBC NEWS, Aug. 5, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/5243862.stm.  
 37 Id. 
 38  Lincoln Millstein, A Star Is Born, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 24, 1995, at 18 
(“[I]t shouldn’t really surprise us that the World Wide Web now accounts for the 
highest amount of traffic on the Net.”). 
 39 See Danny Sullivan, Where Are They Now? Search Engines We’ve Known & 
Loved, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH, Mar. 4, 2003, http://searchenginewatch.com/2175241/ 
print. 
 40 One of the more humorous parts of the early Google story is about Page 
and Brin begging, borrowing, and appropriating hardware and processing power from 
other Stanford departments to build their search engine. See DAVID A. VISE & MARK 
MALSEED, THE GOOGLE STORY 2-3, 40 (2005); JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH 77-78 
(2005).  
  More sobering is the fact that Google’s race for ever-larger mountains of 
hardware never ended, and today is funding a mammoth and secretive project in the 
Oregon wilderness alongside the Columbia River. Google’s investments in physical 
infrastructure for search are so huge that they may help it maintain its market 
position against new entrants. See Daniel Terdiman, Jostling to get inside Google’s 
Oregon Outpost, CNET NEWS, JUNE 29, 2006, http://news.com /Jostling+to+get+inside+ 
Googles+Oregon+outpost/2100-1030_3-6089518.html. 
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it was not clear why they thought their project was worth 
pursuing. In dot-com business circles, it was believed that 
while the technology of Internet search was not ideal, it was 
not worth improving.41 
But in fact, the search engines of 1997 were far less 
useful than Google is today. Generally, they failed to provide 
users with relevant results.42 And the companies that held 
themselves out as search engines were not that interested in 
making their search engines better. The conventional wisdom 
of the major search engines was that given their power as 
“hubs” of the Internet, they should become information and 
entertainment “portals” (see Figure 1). Portals would negotiate 
deals with traditional media companies in order to secure the 
best content (which they believed would not be free).43 Portals 
  
 41 BATTELLE, supra note 40, at 83-84; VISE & MALSEED, supra note 40, at  
46-47. 
 42 VISE & MALSEED, supra note 40, at 55. 
 43 BATTELLE, supra note 40, at 83-84; VISE & MALSEED, supra note 40, at 46-
47. The presumption that the free Web would be useless was probably the biggest 
mistake most dot-com investors and businesses made. See generally Hunter & 
 
Figure 1    The 1999 default homepage of excite.com features polls, direc-
tories, weather forecasts, news, offers to buy books, chat rooms, stock quotes, 
horoscopes, etc. Excite’s search function is eclipsed by its attempts to become 
an all-purpose Web portal. 
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therefore attempted to make deals with major media compa-
nies to get access to “premium” news, services, information, 
and entertainment. While they pursued this goal, they sought 
revenues from advertising. 
Improving search technology was actually inconsistent 
with the portal philosophy. The greatest profits, it was thought, 
would come from “stickiness,” that is, keeping people on the 
portal’s website, showing them ads, and channeling them 
toward premium partnered content.44 Providing a better index 
of content “outside” the portal would simply be rewarding 
competitor portals and sending user eyeballs and advertising 
dollars away.45 
Perhaps fortunately for Google, graduate students  
Brin and Page lacked the finances and commercial instincts 
required to play the portal game. Brin and Page, at least 
initially, had a strong aversion to advertising, which they 
believed detracted from their goal of improving the search 
experience.46  
Google launched with a near vacant,47 fast-loading48 
home page that constituted a complete rejection of the portal 
approach (see Figure 2). It was radically centered on the user 
experience and expressed the anti-advertising philosophy of its 
founders. This focus on the user helped define and popularize 
Google’s brand reputation for fast and focused user-centered 
searches.49 The austere original design remains today, at a time 
when each white pixel on the home page is worth a fortune. 
  
Lastowka, supra note 26 (explaining the social and historical roots of the presumption 
and how “amateur” copyright practices defy it by providing much of the social utility of 
the Web). 
 44 See VISE & MALSEED, supra note 40, at 104. 
 45 Id. at 42 (stating this was why Yahoo! declined to purchase Google); cf. 
Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 1990-91 (2006) 
(describing the “walled garden” approach to content pursued by early Internet service 
providers like CompuServe and Prodigy). 
 46 Brin & Page, supra note 1. 
 47 VISE & MALSEED, supra note 40, at 78 (explaining how many Google beta 
testers confronted with the search engine’s page did not believe it had loaded). The 
pure and popular whiteness of Google’s homepage has concerned some. One company 
today offers a black Google homepage that utilizes Google’s search function. Blackle 
claims that it has conserved over 100,000 Watt hours of energy by turning off the white 
pixels. See Blackle—Energy Saving Search, http://www.blackle.com/ (last visited Feb. 
25, 2008). 
 48 As Google’s Marissa Meyer has explained, application speed is essential to 
the quality of user experiences. Dan Farber, Google’s Marissa Mayer: Speed Wins, 
ZDNET: BETWEEN THE LINES, http://blogs.zdnet.com/BTL/?p=3925 (Nov. 9, 2006). 
 49 See James Caufield, Where Did Google Get Its Value?, 5 LIBRARIES & THE 
ACADEMY 555, 562 (2005) (“[W]hat differentiated [Google] from other search engines 
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The key appeal of Google, however, was not a predom-
inantly blank home page, but instead the superior quality of  
its results. Google’s technological advance, which Page later 
patented, was essentially a way of letting the Web speak for 
itself. Rather than relying exclusively on algorithmic science to 
parse data and calculate relevance, Page came up with a 
simple formula that determined the popularity of Web pages. 
PageRank (a play on Page’s last name) took every hyperlink 
written on the Web to be a kind of vote for the importance of 
the Web page it pointed to. The application of PageRank to 
search results allowed the most popular Web pages to float to 
the top of Google’s search results. Combined with link analysis 
techniques, PageRank made Google’s search results noticeably 
better and allowed users to obtain more relevant results in 
response to their search terms.50 
  
was its willingness to adopt at least some of the traditional values of libraries and 
other information services.”). 
 50 See Google, Technology Overview, http://www.google.com/corporate/tech.html 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2008). The website explains: 
 
Figure 2   The 1999 default google.com beta homepage is clearly focused on 
user search to the exclusion of all else. Google’s current home page is almost 
equally minimalistic. 
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Google’s focus on improving relevance was closely tied to 
its anti-advertising stance. In the same 1998 paper in which 
they explained how PageRank worked, Brin and Page also 
offered a reason why Google was opposed to advertising: 
“[A]dvertising income often provides an incentive to provide 
poor quality search results.”51 Brin and Page explained that 
advertising-funded search engines would be inclined to simply 
direct users to their advertising partners. They hoped Google 
could avoid this conflict by avoiding advertising altogether: 
“[T]he issue of advertising causes enough mixed incentives that 
it is crucial to have a competitive search engine that is 
transparent and in the academic realm.”52  
Yet by 2000, only three years after Google’s launch, Brin 
and Page had accepted millions of dollars in venture capital 
while having no real business model.53 Beholden to their 
investors in a climate where other online ventures were reeling 
from the dot-com collapse, Page and Brin reluctantly began 
selling advertising under a program called AdWords.54 Their 
continued distaste for advertising was evident. There were no 
advertisements on the home page, which remained vacant. The 
ads, shown on results pages, contained no images, were printed 
in a uniform small text font, were shaded blue, and were 
segregated to the right side of the results listings under the 
words “Sponsored links.”  
  
Google uses numerous factors including its patented PageRank™ algorithm 
to examine the entire link structure of the web and determine which pages 
are most important. It then conducts hypertext-matching analysis to 
determine which pages are relevant to the specific search being conducted. 
By combining overall importance and query-specific relevance, Google is able 
to put the most relevant and reliable results first. 
Id. For a good explanation of how Google currently combines PageRank with the text of 
hyperlink pointers and other data to calculate rankings, see Danny Sullivan, What Is 
Google PageRank? A Guide for Searchers & Webmasters, http://searchengineland.com/ 
070426-011828.php (Apr. 26, 2007). 
 51 Brin & Page, supra note 1. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Ben Elgin, How Google Got Its Groove, BUS. WEEK, Sept. 19, 2005, at 144 
(“Google Inc.’s breathtaking success makes it difficult to recollect the search startup of 
five years ago: a cash-burning outfit with no business model, teetering one misguided 
decision away from the dot-com rubble.”). 
 54 The company recounts these steps more fully in its corporate history. See 
Google, Corporate Information: Google Milestones, http://www.google.com/corporate/ 
history.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2008). Accounts of Google’s advertising developments 
can also be found in the two leading popular histories of Google. BATTELLE, supra note 
40, at 121-29; VISE & MALSEED, supra note 40, at 93-102, 123-52. 
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Yet when Google adopted advertising, it stole its most 
profitable idea from an unusual source: GoTo.com.55 GoTo.com, 
like Google, was a search engine launched in 1997.56 The busi-
ness model of GoTo.com was, from a philosophical standpoint, 
diametrically opposed to the academic and anti-advertising 
ethos of Google. Rather than resisting advertising, GoTo.com 
offered users pure advertising.  
GoTo.com sold its search results to advertisers under a 
paid placement business model.57 It auctioned placement under 
specific search terms.58 The highest bidder would achieve the 
highest placement in search results for a given term. For 
instance, a user who searched on GoTo.com for “running shoes” 
would be shown a page of advertisements ranked according  
to the amount of money each purchaser paid GoTo.com. 
Additionally, advertisers would pay GoTo.com only when users 
clicked on a hyperlink pointing to their page, thus ensuring 
that advertising payments were linked directly to the consumer 
traffic provided by GoTo.com.  
Though the GoTo.com model was profitable for the 
company, perhaps for understandable reasons, a search engine 
limited to paid advertising did not generate a great deal of 
positive word of mouth. Instead, the majority of GoTo.com’s 
revenues were derived from licensing its “results” for 
“syndication” on other search engines.59 Essentially, GoTo.com 
would enter into deals with companies like AOL whereby it 
would buy screen space accompanying other search engine 
results and return a portion of its revenues to the hosting site.60 
With regard to its advertising efforts in its right-hand 
column, Google copied the GoTo.com model wholesale, ulti-
mately settling a patent infringement lawsuit based on its 
appropriation of the practice.61 Like GoTo.com, Google sold 
  
 55 For more information about the history of GoTo.com, see John Battelle’s 
colorful rendition of the history of the company and its founder, Bill Gross. BATTELLE, 
supra note 40, at 95-121. 
 56 GoTo.com was renamed Overture in 2001, and was later purchased by 
Yahoo!, Inc. It is currently known as Yahoo! Search Marketing. See Danny Sullivan, 
Pay Per Click Search Engines (CPC/PPC), SEARCHENGINEWATCH.COM, Aug. 13, 2004, 
http://searchenginewatch.com/showPage.html?page=2156291. 
 57 Saul Hansell, Clicks for Sale; Paid Placement Is Catching On in Web 
Searches, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2001 at C1. 
 58 BATTELLE, supra note 40, at 104-08. 
 59 Id. at 113-16. 
 60 Id. This model is very similar to what Google has done with AdSense. See 
infra Part I.E. 
 61 See BATTELLE, supra note 40, at 116.  
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placement to advertisers only under specific terms. Like 
GoTo.com, starting in 2002, advertisers paid Google only if  
and when users clicked on their ads.62 And like GoTo.com, 
Google’s AdWords terms were subject to an automated auction 
mechanism.63  
In short order, AdWords became Google’s diamond 
mine. In 2001, Google turned a profit of $7 million.64 In 2002, 
profits rose to $100 million.65 Four years later, in 2006, Google 
posted revenues of $10 billion from AdWords-type advertising 
sales, compromising over ninety-nine percent of its total 
revenues.66 AdWords revenues are, essentially, the sole source 
of Google’s wealth today. While Google may draw considerable 
media attention through its other promising assets, such as 
Google Earth, Google News, YouTube, etc., these other ven-
tures have all been marginal in terms of their contributions to 
the company’s profits. 
“Mesothelioma” is a search term commonly used to 
demonstrate how AdWords tapped a new form of wealth.67 
Those searching for information about mesothelioma are often 
suffering, or know someone who is suffering, from asbestos-
induced cancer. Class action lawyers want to find these people. 
As a result, Google can sell a single click on an advertisement 
relating to mesothelioma for $30 to $50.68 The high price is the 
result of a fierce bidding war by litigators. 
There are millions of similar niche and not-so-niche 
“term markets” out there, where advertisers bid against each 
  
 62 In 2005, Google also allowed users to purchase CPM (cost per thousand 
impression) advertising. However, given that CPM pricing is the traditional model of 
Internet “banner” advertising that preceded Google, it has apparently not taken off. 
Sajjad Matin, Note, Clicks Ahoy! Navigating Online Advertising in a Sea of Fraudulent 
Clicks, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 533, 536-37 (2007). 
 63 Google added one wrinkle: when many users clicked on an advertisement, 
Google would count this as a “vote” to move that advertisement to the top of the 
AdWords pile. As a result, more popular advertisements preceded less popular ones. 
VISE & MALSEED, supra note 40, at 89-90. This increased “relevancy” and also ensured 
that Google would display the advertisements that were most likely to garner clicks 
and increase its own revenues. 
 64 See VISE & MALSEED, supra note 40, at 305. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10K), at 69 (Mar. 1, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312507044494/d10k.htm. 
 67 See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark 
Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 548 n.150 (2005); BATTELLE, supra note 40, at 110; VISE & 
MALSEED, supra note 40, at 117. 
 68 See Truth in Advertising; Internet Commerce, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 
2006 ($30); Jon Fine, Rise of the Lowly Search Ad, BUS. WEEK, Apr. 24, 2006, at 24 
($50). 
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other for the right to connect with individuals searching for 
“school loans,” “oversize shoes,” “beanie babies,” and everything 
else under the sun. For many advertisers, AdWords purchases 
produce a greater return on investment than traditional media 
channels. A newspaper advertisement about mesothelioma will 
force the advertiser to subsidize a broadcast to many people 
who have no interest. With AdWords, the searcher comes to the 
advertiser, perhaps primed for a commercial transaction and 
just a mouse-click away from completing it. 
C. Two Sample Results Pages 
In order to ground further discussion of AdWords and 
its relation to Google’s primary results with specific examples, 
this section briefly discusses the results Google displayed in the 
summer of 2007 in response to queries for two terms: “cars” 
and “nike.”69 The two terms are selected with a discussion of 
trademark law in mind. The term “cars” might be understood 
by laypersons as a generic term for a class of heavily advertised 
goods (automobiles). The term “nike” probably calls to mind,  
for many readers, the trademark of a particular sneaker 
company.70  
  
 69 It should be noted that Google’s results for any term are inherently 
unstable. Because Google regularly refreshes its Web index and modifies its relevancy 
algorithm, its organic results may change from day to day. 
 70 In fact, as I will explain below, this is a false dichotomy. Both terms have 
established trademark and non-trademark meanings. 
  “Nike” is also part of a proud tradition of law review commentary on search 
engines and trademarks. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion 
Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597-632 (2007) 
[hereinafter Dinwoodie & Janis, Contextualism] (“To ensure that potential NIKE 
consumers are not bamboozled in their efforts to reach the NIKE site, Nike, Inc. has 
purchased a sponsored link on Google that appears in response to a query for NIKE.”); 
Goldman, supra note 67, at 509 (“She enters the word ‘Nike’ into the Google search 
engine in an attempt to find source material for her report . . . .”); Kurt M. Saunders, 
Confusion Is the Key: A Trademark Law Analysis of Keyword Banner Advertising, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 543, 565 (2002) (“[I[f a consumer in search of NIKE athletic shoes 
types in ‘Nike’ . . . .”); Jason Allen Cody, Note, Initial Interest Confusion: What Ever 
Happened to Traditional Likelihood of Confusion Analysis?, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 643, 643 
n.2 (2003) (“On February 14, 2002, the author typed ‘nike’ into a comprehensive search 
engine, Google.”); Jennifer D. Johnson, Comment, Potential Liability Arising Out of the 
Use of Trademarks in Web Site Meta Tags and Ensuring Coverage of Meta Tag 
Trademark Infringement Claims under Commercial Insurance Policies, 50 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 1009, 1019 (2001) (“For example, if a Web user wants to search for Web pages 
containing information on Nike shoes, the user places ‘Nike’ as a search term in a 
search engine.”). “Nike” has even been used as an example search term by Google to 
illustrate its technology. See Google, Our AdWords Trademark Complaint Procedure, 
http://www.google.com/tm_complaint_adwords.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2008) (stating 
that a purchaser of the keyword “shoes” may have advertising displayed in response to 
queries for “Nike shoes”). 
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The screenshot in Figure 3 shows a partial page of 
Google results for “cars” in North America during the summer 
of 2007. In the shaded bar at the top of the page, Google claims 
to have indexed over 300 million websites related to “cars.” 
However, only ten of these 300 million “organic” results—those 
ten that Google’s ranking algorithm deemed most relevant—
have been displayed on the first page of results. The average 
user will only rarely travel beyond this first page of results.71  
The left column lists Google’s organic results, starting 
with multiple sub-domains of the website “cars.com.” The right 
column is filled with AdWords advertisements, displayed under 
the words “Sponsored Links.” About half of the left-column 
organic results for “cars” relate to a Disney movie of that name. 
The other half are links to websites selling and providing 
information about automobiles, like a Washington Post website 
that offers information about cars. 
  
 71 See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 67, at 535, 535 n.85 (citing studies). 
Figure 3    A 2007 search results page for “cars” shows the user-entered 
keyword at the top of the page, the organic (unpaid) results on the left side of 
the page, and the paid “sponsored links” results on the right side of the page. 
Note that the keyed term “cars” is highlighted with bold type in both the 
organic and paid results. 
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Figure 4 shows Google’s results page for “nike.” “Nike” 
is apparently understood by both Google’s algorithm and its 
AdWords advertisers as the proper name of a sneaker com-
pany. All the top-page results and AdWords advertisements 
reflect this meaning of the word. The left column here is 
somewhat different than the last example because Google has 
“awarded” two advertisers (Nike and Finish Line72) with top 
left-column placements for their advertisement, which appear 
above the left-column results.73 The standard left-hand column 
  
 72 Finish Line has some significant advertising partnerships with Nike, 
which may be relevant to the placement. See Reuters, Finish Line and Nike Team Up, 
Aug. 3, 2007, http://www.topix.net/content/reuters/2007/08/finish-line-and-nike-team-
up (reporting on a joint campaign to promote a new line of Nike™ sneakers). 
 73 Ads that appear above the organic listings cannot be purchased from 
Google (at least not currently), but are Google’s way of “rewarding” AdWords pur-
chasers who make their advertisements highly relevant to users (in other words, ads 
that produce a very high click-through rate are put in this position). This is explained 
by a Google employee blogger. See Posting of Blake to Inside AdWords, http:// 
adwords.blogspot.com/2005/12/into-blue.html (Dec. 2, 2005, 15:31 EST) (“At the bottom 
line, highly relevant keywords and ad text, a high CPC, and a strong CTR will result in 
a higher position for your ad and help you rise ‘into the blue.’”). 
Figure 4    A 2007 search for “nike” produces two sponsored links that 
appear above the organic listings (these are lightly shaded in a highlight 
color) and three sponsored links on the right side of the page. The organic 
results are dominated by the websites of the Nike™ athletic wear company. 
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follows these two advertisements and includes several links to 
the Nike company’s websites. In the right column, various 
AdWords advertisements for the search term “Nike” are listed. 
These include advertisers that sell Nike footwear as well as 
other brands of sneakers. 
D. The Left and Right Columns 
During its short history, Google has repeatedly pro-
claimed that its business model bears no resemblance to the 
model of GoTo.com, in which advertisers paid for prominent 
placement in results.74 Google draws a bright line between left-
column “results” and right-column “advertisements.”75 The 
Google home page states, “[W]e always distinguish ads from 
the search results or other content on a page. We don’t sell 
placement in the search results themselves, or allow people to 
pay for a higher ranking there.”76 
In a 2004 statement to prospective shareholders, under 
the heading “DON’T BE EVIL,” Google stated: 
Our search results are the best we know how to produce. They are 
unbiased and objective, and we do not accept payment for them or 
for inclusion or more frequent updating. We also display advertising, 
which we work hard to make relevant, and we label it clearly. This is 
similar to a newspaper, where the advertisements are clear and the 
articles are not influenced by the advertisers’ payments.77 
So according to Google’s public relations, one way it avoids 
“being evil” is by refusing to allow its left-hand column to be 
purchased, while making its right-hand column its profit 
center. There are clearly echoes here of the Google founders’ 
former aversion to advertising. On the other hand, placement 
in the right-hand column must be purchased. And in the right 
column, a lack of relevance is no bar to placement if an 
advertiser is willing to pay.78 
  
 74 See BATTELLE, supra note 40, at 115-16. 
 75 See James Caufield, supra note 49, at 564 (explaining Google’s historical 
anti-advertising ethos and stating “Google has erected a barrier between advertising 
and search”). 
 76 Google, Inc., Company Information: Corporate Overview, http://www.google 
.com/intl/en/corporate/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2008). 
 77 Google Owner’s Manual, supra note 4, at vi. 
 78 However, advertisements producing fewer clicks (and fewer revenues for 
Google) are threatened with removal unless payments per click are increased. For 
example, in the summer of 2007, I bought an AdWords placement for the keyword 
“nike” that pointed to an unrelated weblog. After about 400 impressions that 
(unsurprisingly) led to no click-throughs, Google informed me that I might remain 
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The left/right distinction is very important to Google, 
but studies have shown it is not important to the average 
user.79 In fact, the average Google user does not distinguish 
between the two types of links. According to one recent study, 
five out of six search engine users cannot tell the difference 
between sponsored links and organic results, and roughly half 
are unaware that a difference between the two exists.80 
To the extent users are uncertain about the nature of 
right column advertisements and left column “organic results” 
on Google, Google’s design choices may not help the situation. 
As the screenshots show, AdWords advertisements appear in 
generally the same format as organic results and this may lead 
users to equate them. The small words “Sponsored Links” and 
the pastel shading of the AdWords could be ambiguous. To 
someone unfamiliar with the details of Google’s advertising 
practices, it might seem as if Google is suggesting that the 
advertisements are more relevant (that is, Google “sponsors” 
the results). In 2002, the Federal Trade Commission warned 
search engines that they were obliged to clearly differentiate 
paid results from non-paid results.81 However, the FTC has yet 
to take any action.82  
There is another good reason that users may not spot 
the difference between Google’s right and left columns. Google’s 
left-hand column is, in fact, subject to market forces in ways 
that can make it similar to the right-hand column. Businesses 
seeking consumer traffic realize that both columns are simply 
  
listed by increasing my bid from $1 per click to $5 per click. (I declined.) (Printouts on 
file with author.) 
 79 See Goldman, supra note 67, at 518 (discussing “artificial divisions” 
between ads and content). 
 80 See Deborah Fallows, Search Engine Users, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE 
PROJECT, Jan. 23, 2005, at 17-18, available at http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/ 
146/report_display.asp (“Among the 38% of internet users who are aware of the 
practice [of two different types of search results], some 47% of searchers say they can 
always tell which results are paid or sponsored and which are not. This represents 
about one in six of all internet searchers.”). It should be noted that this study 
apparently included other search engines—studies conducted specifically with regard 
to Google’s practices would be more ideal. Id. 
 81 Letter from Heather Hippsley, Acting Associate Dir., F.T.C. Division of 
Advertising Practices, to Gary Ruskin, Executive Director, Commercial Alert (June 27, 
2002), available at http://www.commercialalert.org/PDFs/ftcresponse.pdf (“[T]he staff 
recommends that if your search engine uses paid placement, you make any changes to 
the presentation of your paid-ranking search results that would be necessary to clearly 
delineate them as such, whether they are segregated from, or inserted into, non-paid 
listings.”). 
 82 See generally Andrew Sinclair, Note, Regulation of Paid Listings in 
Internet Search Engines: A Proposal for FTC Action, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 353 
(2004) (arguing that the FTC should take action with respect to paid placement). 
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lists of links. Being first in the left-hand column may provide 
more traffic to a site than paying for an AdWords advertise-
ment.83 Many small e-commerce fortunes have been found  
(or lost) by inadvertently pleasing (or displeasing) the organic 
Google algorithms that structure the left-hand column.84 As a 
result, a profitable business has grown up around the science of 
reverse engineering Google’s algorithm and adapting business 
websites to please it. This practice is known as “search engine 
optimization,” or “SEO” for short. 
Google has little to gain from helping the SEO business 
flourish.85 As Brin and Page realized in 1998, completely 
following the GoTo.com model would likely produce search 
results that are not ideal for users. Displeased users might look 
for a better search engine. If Google cannot capture profits  
from the left-hand column for fear of displeasing users, then its 
optimal strategy should be combating SEO that undermines 
the indexical utility that column provides to users. In addition, 
by combating SEO, Google can drive advertisers to its right-
hand column and can gain greater profits. 
Yet the SEO economy is here to stay and is currently 
valued at $4.1 billion.86 This makes questionable Google’s claim 
that the left-hand column is not commercially influenced. Many 
SEO techniques are not “evil,” but rather common sense (albeit 
technically obscure) methods designed to maximize search 
engine ranking. Yet these benefits are reaped only by those 
who are able to pay for them.  
  
 83 Studies indicate that the first link in search results draws much more 
traffic than the second link—regardless of the text of the link. See Jakob Nielsen,  
The Power of Defaults, ALERTBOX, Sept. 26, 2005, http://www.useit.com/alertbox/ 
defaults.html; Bing Pan et al., In Google We Trust: Users’ Decisions on Rank, Position, 
and Relevance, J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 12(3) (2007), available at http:// 
jcmc.indiana.edu/vol12/issue3/pan.html (“In summary, the findings here show that 
college student subjects are heavily influenced by the order in which the results are 
presented and, to a lesser extent, the actual relevance of the abstracts.”). 
 84 See, e.g., Paul Sloan, How to Scale Mt. Google: Getting Your Site on the 
First Page Can Turn a Hobby into a Thriving Business, CNNMONEY, May 14, 2007, 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/business2/business2_archive/2007/05/01/8405661/index
.htm (explaining how a small business selling kitchen cabinets used search engine 
optimization techniques to go from negligible profits to “revenue of $10,000 a month 
and more inquiries than her one-woman business can handle”); Who’s Afraid of 
Google?, supra note 3 (“Many small firms hate Google because they relied on exploiting 
its search formulas to win prime positions in its rankings, but dropped to the internet’s 
equivalent of Hades after Google tweaked these algorithms.”). 
 85 See generally James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 
94 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), draft available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=979568 (explaining the various techniques of SEO and stating 
that “[s]trong market incentives compel search engines to combat SEO”). 
 86 Sloan, supra note 84. 
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Google’s algorithm can also be gamed by more devious 
SEO practices that can sometimes lead to retaliatory actions by 
Google. While Google condones “honest” SEO, it cautions 
against hiring “aggressive” SEO companies that “unfairly 
manipulate search engine results” in ways that are “beyond the 
pale.”87 This is obviously a fuzzy line and Google’s conduct has 
not done much to clarify the distinction it draws between fair 
and unfair SEO. This might be best exemplified by Google’s 
responses to the practice of “Google-bombing.” Google-bombing 
is based on a well-known feature of Google’s link analysis 
algorithm. As Steve Johnson has explained, part of Google’s 
ranking algorithm has included the analysis of a hyperlink’s 
textual content.88 So, for example, if the majority of hyperlinks 
with the text “Nike” point to the website of Nike, Inc., Google 
might be more likely to list that website as an early result. 
Google-bombers exploit this fact by repeatedly linking a 
particular target phrase to a particular target website.89  
In 2005, Google vice-president Marissa Meyer acknowl-
edged Google-bombers had managed to link Google’s top result 
for “failure” and “miserable failure” to the website of the White 
House, but explained that Google was reluctant to intervene 
with this outcome: “We don’t condone the practice of google-
bombing, or any other action that seeks to affect the integrity 
of our search results, but we’re also reluctant to alter our 
results by hand in order to prevent such items from showing 
up.”90 
SEO tactics, both “fair” and “unfair” (and those in 
between), produce higher left column rankings. Therefore, 
economically rational businesses should weigh dollars spent on 
  
 87 See Google, What’s an SEO? Does Google recommend working with 
companies that offer to make my site Google-friendly?, http://www.google.com/support/ 
webmasters/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=35291 (last visited Feb. 25, 2008) (“[A] few 
unethical SEOs have given the industry a black eye through their overly aggressive 
marketing efforts and their attempts to unfairly manipulate search engine results . . . . 
While Google doesn’t comment on specific companies, we’ve encountered firms calling 
themselves SEOs who follow practices that are clearly beyond the pale of accepted 
business behavior. Be careful.”); Frank A. Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and 
Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 115, 124 n.41 (2006). 
 88  Steven Johnson, The Art of Googlebombing: How the Mighty Internet 
Search Engine’s Rankings of Results Can Be Manipulated, DISCOVER, July 1, 2004,  
at 22. 
 89 Pasquale, supra note 87, at 121. 
 90 Posting of Marissa Mayer to Official Google Blog, http://googleblog.blogspot 
.com/2005/09/googlebombing-failure.html (Sept. 16, 2005, 12:54 EST) (“Pranks like this 
may be distracting to some, but they don’t affect the overall quality of our search 
service, whose objectivity, as always, remains the core of our mission.”). 
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AdWords against dollars spent on SEO.91 The New York Times 
recently admitted that it has been using SEO “to make money 
by driving traffic to its Web site.”92 An editor for the Times 
declared that its SEO tactics push “Times content to or near 
the top of search results, regardless of its importance or 
accuracy.”93 Given the importance of SEO, it can be hard to see 
the much-vaunted distinction between the left-hand and right-
hand columns on Google. Both are commercially influenced.  
Google’s interest in the distinction between advertising 
results and organic results should be understood as an interest 
not so much based on avoiding “evil,” but primarily on securing 
profit. Clicks on “nike” AdWords advertisements produce 
revenues for Google. Clicks on left-column “nike” results may 
take the user to the same business, but produce no revenues for 
Google. Google’s bottom line depends on the difference between 
its left and right columns. However, users searching for “nike” 
on Google are likely to be sent to a sneaker company in either 
case.94 
E. A Note on AdSense  
In 2003, Google added further complexity to its adver-
tising model by introducing AdSense.95 According to recent 
financial statements from Google, a majority of Google’s 
current revenues are generated by AdWords, while AdSense 
accounts for a significant minority percentage.96 Though an  
in-depth analysis of the structure of AdSense is beyond the 
  
 91 See Pasquale, supra note 87, at 129 (explaining how “the first unpaid 
result is likely to get ten times the traffic of the tenth”). Pasquale views the practice of 
SEO as an “arms race” generating negative economic externalities, drawing an 
interesting comparison to U.S. News Rankings. Id. at 130-34. 
 92 Clark Hoyt, When Bad News Follows You, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, at 
WK10. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Cf. Goldman, supra note 67, at 509 (hypothesizing a situation where, due 
to the influence of trademark law on search results, a future student might search for 
“nike” on Google and be unable to find information on the mythological figure). It may 
well be that with or without trademark law influencing search results, the 
mythological Nike will be comparatively obscure in the world of search engines. 
 95 See Google, Corporate Information: Google Milestones, http://www.google 
.com/corporate/history.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2008). 
 96 In the first quarter of 2007, Google generated approximately $2.3 billion 
(62% of revenues) from AdWords and approximately $1.3 billion (37% of revenues) from 
AdSense. See Google Investor Relations, Google Announces First Quarter 2007 Results, 
http://investor.google.com/releases/2007Q1.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2008). 
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scope of this Article, it is worth briefly describing how the 
AdSense model differs from the AdWords model.97 
AdSense is a program whereby website owners are paid 
by Google to provide advertising space on their websites where 
AdWords advertisements are displayed. The precise adver-
tisements displayed are determined by a process similar to the 
process that determines AdWords placements in search results. 
However, given that the AdSense ads are incorporated in 
websites and are not triggered by searches, Google’s algorithm 
matches advertisements to the text of the website rather  
than search term. Hence, a website describing the Greek 
goddess Nike might display AdSense advertisements for Nike 
sneakers.98 According to Google, “AdSense technology analyzes 
the text on any given page and delivers ads that are appro-
priate and relevant, increasing the usefulness of the page and 
the likelihood that those viewing it will actually click on the 
advertising presented there.”99 
The AdSense program draws hosting sites into a closer 
relationship with Google. Because Google operates as an index, 
almost all small websites are partially dependent on Google for 
the traffic they receive.100 AdSense allows small and large 
websites that seek profits to partner with Google and share in 
revenues. When website viewers click on AdSense advertise-
ments, the advertisers pay Google for the traffic generated, and 
Google forwards a percentage of the proceeds to the website 
that hosts the AdSense advertisement.101  
One major criticism of the AdSense model is its 
relationship to a “clickfraud” industry built around “false click-
  
 97 For more information about clickfraud and legal claims against it, see 
generally Matin, supra note 62. 
 98 Though Google’s current algorithm is smart enough to promote travel to 
Greece most of the time, the occasional sneaker ad actually does appear. (Printout on 
file with author.) 
 99 Google, Corporate Information: Google Milestones, http://www.google.com/ 
corporate/history.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2008). 
 100 To take a random example, the law blog Concurring Opinions receives the 
majority of its traffic from search engines, with Google accounting for the substantial 
majority of search engine traffic. See eXTReMe Tracking, http://extremetracking.com/ 
open;ref2?login=solo1111 (last visited Feb. 25, 2008). 
 101 BATTELLE, supra note 40, at 151-52. AdSense has even crept into the 
“market” (such as it is) for law review articles: the academic paper-hosting website 
Social Science Research Network (“SSRN”) generates revenues by displaying AdSense 
advertisements. For instance, at present a draft of Professor Mark A. Lemley’s 
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005), is 
associated by Google with ads for the law firms of Myers, Boebel & MacLeod and Buus 
Kim Kuo & Tran LLP. Another popular paper by Professor Orin Kerr features 
advertisements for Harry Potter ring tones. (Web page printouts on file with author.) 
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throughs.”102 Advertisers generally and reasonably trust that 
traffic flowing from Google’s results pages is genuine. However, 
AdSense is prone to a systemic failure. AdSense hosts have an 
incentive to maximize their income by maximizing the number 
of times users click through on hosted advertisements. While 
most AdSense hosts generate their viewer traffic and AdSense 
profits in “fair” ways (for example, making their websites more 
likely to attract attention), there are more direct ways to 
generate clicks on advertisements.  
If a click is worth a dollar to an AdSense host, it is 
hardly surprising that some hosts will pay individuals some-
thing less than a dollar to click on their advertisements. Many 
unscrupulous websites have been willing to split their AdSense 
profits with paid teams of so-called click-farmers who generate 
fake AdWord clicks (that is, clicks that are not based on any 
actual interest in the advertising). Analysts estimate that 
around five to twenty percent of AdSense clicks are generated 
by such clickfraud.103 This makes clickfraud a multi-billion 
dollar business. 
While Google has recognized that clickfraud is a 
problem, it is also true that Google must profit from undetected 
clickfraud practices in the short term.104 While Google does  
not charge for “invalid clicks” that it detects and has a division 
that works to combat clickfraud,105 it is not clear that Google 
has any strong incentive to address the problem. Google’s CEO, 
Eric Schmidt, has even stated that the clickfraud situation is 
“self-correcting” and that the market can provide a perfect 
“economic solution” to the problem.106 This has not deterred 
class action suits against Google based on the practice, one of 
which was recently settled for ninety million dollars.107 As a 
  
 102 VISE & MALSEED, supra note 40, at 240-49.  
 103 Matin, supra note 62, at 540-41.  
 104 VISE & MALSEED, supra note 40, at 248 (“Google has the data, but not the 
incentive, to put sufficient resources into fighting clickfraud . . . .”).  
 105 See Google, Google Ad Traffic Quality Resource Center: Overview, 
http://www.google.com/adwords/adtrafficquality/overview.html (last visited Feb. 25, 
2008) (“[W]e protect advertisers against click fraud by not charging for suspicious 
clicks. The intent of a click is difficult to determine with a high degree of scientific 
accuracy. We therefore create a high false positive rate by marking a much larger 
number of clicks as invalid compared to the number of clicks we believe to be generated 
with bad intent.”). 
 106 Posting of Donna Bogatin to ZDNET (July 9, 2006, 4:51 EST), http://blogs 
.zdnet.com/micro-markets/index.php?p=219 (“According to Schmidt, Google’s auction-
based pay-per-click advertising model is inherently self-correcting.”). 
 107 Matin, supra note 62, at 546; Final Order and Judgment Approving 
Settlement, Lane’s Gifts and Collectibles LLC v. Yahoo! Inc., No. CV-2005-52-1 (Ark. 
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recent student note points out, the legal obligations of Google 
to police against clickfraud have not been conclusively settled 
by courts.108 
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL STATUS OF SEARCH RESULTS 
A. Non-Trademark Search Regulation 
This second Part considers attempts to use law to 
regulate the structure of Google’s results. As an initial matter, 
it is worth observing how the law clearly does regulate Google’s 
results in many ways. In its right-hand column, Google, by its 
own policies, prohibits twenty-eight types of AdWords adver-
tising.109 Among the prohibited advertisements are those for 
prostitution, child pornography, computer hacking tools, wea-
pons, and counterfeit goods.110 These bans are clearly motivated 
by Google’s concerns over legal liability. In its left column, 
Google has a policy of removing certain search results from its 
indices when copyright holders notify Google that the linked 
resources contain infringing material.111 The procedure that 
Google follows affords it a “safe harbor” from infringement 
liability under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.112 
The key question about Google, therefore, is not whether 
its results pages should be regulated per se, but whether 
search results require a more specific form of regulation. 
Google’s business model is different from that found in other 
media. One does not consult a daily newspaper to rapidly 
discover useful information about mesothelioma lawyers, Phil 
Rizzuto, or “phrogging.”113 
  
Cir. Ct. complaint filed Feb. 17, 2005). Given that Google generated roughly $4 billion 
in 2006 from AdSense, this actually is a very favorable settlement from Google’s 
standpoint. Much of the settlement consists of “credits” to advertisers. 
 108 Matin, supra note 62, at 540 (noting that there is no industry-accepted 
definition for an “invalid click”). 
 109 See Google, Google AdWords: Content Policy, https://adwords.google.com/ 
select/contentpolicy.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2008). 
 110 Id. 
 111 See Google, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, http://www.google.com/ 
dmca.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2008). 
 112 Id. 
 113 This term “phrogging” apparently means living in someone else’s home 
without their knowledge or permission. It can be found in Google’s “Hot Trends,” a list 
of search queries that became rapidly popular on given dates. For instance, on August 
14, 2007, the Google top ten Hot Trends were as follows: “1. phil rizzuto, 2. phrogging, 
3. sentinel management group, 4. sue scheff, 5. vomit island, 6. paycheck showdown, 7. 
sentinel funds, 8. craig carton, 9. albert insinnia, 10. tiger woods design.” For more 
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If our concerns are about the general nature of Google’s 
results pages, we might start by taking the earlier examples 
(“cars” and “nike”) and looking for flaws. It is not hard to find 
some basis for criticism.114 
Traditional mass media has been criticized for many 
reasons, but legal commentary has often emphasized the way 
in which it tends to privilege majority preferences over more 
diverse viewpoints, and the way that it favors information that 
is commercially effective over information that is less integral 
to facilitating commercial transactions.115 Both of these 
criticisms apply fully to the “cars” and “nike” results provided 
by Google. 
Google clearly demonstrates a commercial bias in the 
searches for both “cars” and “nike.” Though most dictionaries 
suggest that “cars” is the plural of a term for automobiles, 
Google’s results correlate the term, in significant part, with a 
recent Disney movie. And whereas most all dictionaries define 
the word “nike” as the name of the Greek goddess of victory, 
Google’s right and left columns privilege information about 
(and largely created by) a sneaker company.116 
There is also a significant and systemic bias in favor of 
majority preferences. Google’s PageRank formula is designed to 
privilege websites that win the most “votes” in the form of 
hyperlinks. The commercial bias and the popular bias of Google 
are difficult to disaggregate. Commercial influence drives 
offline and online advertising and social prominence. So it may 
be that “cars” is highly correlated with a Disney movie because 
many Web authors exposed to Disney’s advertising and 
entertainment have now associated the term with the movie  
in hyperlinks. The same may be true of the shape of “nike” 
results. Google may simply be a mirror held up to a consumer 
culture. Of course, there might be other explanations: if Disney 
and Nike are engaging in sophisticated SEO, their investments 
  
query demographics, see Google, Hot Trends, http://www.google.com/trends/hottrends 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2008). 
 114 For an early critique of search engines, see generally Introna & 
Nissenbaum, supra note 4 (criticizing the manner in which search engines display 
results).  
 115 See Frank A. Pasquale & Oren Bracha, Federal Search Commission? 
Access, Fairness and Accountability in the Law of Search (Univ. of Texas Law, Pub. 
Law Research Paper No. 123, July 23, 2007), at 7, draft available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1002453.  
 116 Google does eventually provide results that reflect the mythological 
meaning, just not on its first page. 
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may also be responsible for the prominence of “cars” and “nike” 
in the organic results.  
If we look for commercial influence in the right column, 
it is nearly total. The AdWords in the right-hand column are 
ranked according to the highest bidder, conditioned only by  
the popularity of the advertisements with users. This should 
naturally result in a bias toward both commercial influence 
and majority preferences. In short, Google’s results pages are 
prone to exactly the same types of bias found in traditional 
mass media.117 
This may be disappointing to those hoping that Google 
might be able to remedy the biases of traditional media. We 
might ask if Google could be required to provide results that 
are more diverse or less responsive to commercial influence. 
However, even if there were political will sufficient to enact 
broad legislation, it is not clear that it would withstand a legal 
challenge. In litigation, Google has argued that its results 
pages simply represent Google’s opinion (or the opinion 
produced by its algorithm) about sites relevant to the search 
terms.118 As such, even if Google were to follow the model of 
GoTo.com and only direct users to sites according to 
advertising payments, it might claim protection under the First 
Amendment (unless its results were somehow deceptive).  
A line of cases is beginning to reflect this view, 
according Google the freedom to provide results in any way it 
deems fit, including through the hand-editing of its indices. 
The two most prominent cases have been Search King, Inc. v. 
Google Technology, Inc.,119 brought in the Western District of 
Oklahoma, and KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc.,120 brought 
in the Northern District of California.  
  
 117 For a thorough discussion of the potential biases inherent in Google’s 
results, see Alejandro M. Diaz, Through the Google Goggles: Sociopolitical Bias in 
Search Engine Design (2005) (unpublished master’s thesis), available at http:// 
www.stanford.edu/~amd/download/thesis_final.pdf. 
 118  See Langdon v. Google, 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007). In this case, a 
pro se plaintiff argued that Google failed to “honestly” rank his website in its search 
results. Id. at 629. Google defended its practice on the basis that the First Amendment 
precluded relief requiring it to change its rankings. Id. at 629-30. The plaintiff did not 
challenge this argument and the court found in Google’s favor. Id. 
 119 No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 
2003). For additional discussion of the Search King case, see Pasquale, supra note 87, 
at 124-25. 
 120 No. C 06-2057, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45700 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2006); 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82481 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006); 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22648 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007); 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22637 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007). 
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In Search King, the plaintiff was a company based in 
Oklahoma that engaged in a form of SEO.121 Google believed 
Search King’s practices abused and manipulated its algo-
rithm.122 Search King’s business model was oriented around 
locating Web pages that had a high Google PageRank and then 
acting as a middleman, paying those sites to link to its 
clients.123 Essentially, Search King was monetizing the value of 
PageRank by paying those sites with high PageRank to extend 
their good PageRank to others via outbound links. 
But Search King’s efforts to build a free market for 
PageRank in the left-hand column were not in keeping with 
Google’s desire to avoid “evil” in that space. When Google 
learned of Search King’s practices, it reduced Search King’s 
PageRank, as well as the PageRank ratings of associated 
websites.124 Google never explicitly admitted that Search King 
had been targeted for “hand-editing,”125 but employees at 
Google have confirmed that certain other websites have been 
penalized in this way and specifically removed from Google’s 
index in response to certain SEO techniques.126 
  
 121 See Search King, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193, at *4; Search King, 
http://www.searchking.com/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2008). 
 122 On its web page, Search King disagrees and vigorously defends its SEO 
practices. See Search King, The Fallacy of SEO, http://www.searchking.com/seo-
fallacy.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2008) (“Search Engine Optimization (SEO) has been 
defined as the art of manipulating the search engines. That is false. SEO does not 
manipulate search engines.”). 
 123 Search King, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193, at *3 (“[The advertising 
network’s] fee is based, in part, on the PageRank assigned to the web site on which its 
client’s advertisement and/or link is placed.”). 
 124 Id. (“In August or September of 2002, Search King’s PageRank dropped 
[from 8] to 4; [PR Ad Network’s] PageRank was eliminated completely, resulting in ‘no 
rank’.”). 
 125 Bob Massa, the proprietor of Search King, claimed he was targeted as a 
“spammer.” See Stefanie Olsen, Google Counters Search-Fix Lawsuit, CNET NEWS, 
Jan. 10, 2003, http://www.news.com/2100-1023-980215.html (“They arbitrarily singled 
us out. They make up rules, and they decide you’re a spammer, and boom! you’re gone. 
There’s no recourse. Search engines have to be held accountable.”). 
 126 The head of Google’s Webspam team, Matt Cutts, has confirmed that 
Google penalizes sites in its “official capacity.” See Posting of Matt Cutts to Matt Cutts: 
Gadgets, Google, and SEO, http://www.mattcutts.com/blog/confirming-a-penalty/ (Feb. 
11, 2006, 11:42 EST). 
I can confirm that Google has removed traffic-power.com and domains 
promoted by Traffic Power from our index because of search engine 
optimization techniques that violated our webmaster guidelines at 
http://www.google.com/webmasters/guidelines.html. If you are a client or 
former client of Traffic Power and your site is not in Google, please see my 
previous advice on requesting reinclusion into Google’s index to learn what 
steps to take if you would like to be reincluded in Google’s index. 
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Search King brought suit, alleging that Google’s Page-
Rank rating penalties constituted tortious interference with 
contractual relations.127 Essentially it claimed that Google had 
destroyed its advertising business by removing its site from 
search listings. Search King’s request for a preliminary 
injunction was denied and Google brought a motion to 
dismiss.128 The key question was whether, under applicable 
Oklahoma law, Google’s actions were “malicious and wrongful” 
and “not justified, privileged, or excusable.”129 Google argued 
that reductions in PageRank were opinions protected by the 
First Amendment.130 Search King responded by pointing out 
how PageRank was a patented formula that Google claimed to 
be “objectively verifiable.”131 The court sided with Google: 
[T]he Court finds that PageRanks do not contain provably false 
connotations. PageRanks are opinions—opinions of the significance 
of particular web sites as they correspond to a search query. Other 
search engines express different opinions, as each search engine’s 
method of determining relative significance is unique. The Court 
simply finds there is no conceivable way to prove that the relative 
significance assigned to a given web site is false.132 
The court held that Search King had failed to state a claim and 
dismissed the suit.133 
The KinderStart case involved somewhat similar facts. 
KinderStart.com is a website that provides a directory with 
information and resources related to young children.134 In 2003, 
KinderStart.com became a Google AdSense affiliate,135 and two 
years later KinderStart.com claimed monthly traffic amounting 
  
Id. During the same week, Google confirmed that it had “blacklisted” the German 
website of auto manufacturer BMW for using improper SEO tactics. Tom Espiner, 
Google Blacklists BMW.de, CNET NEWS, Feb. 6, 2006, http://news.com.com/Google+ 
blacklists+BMW.de/2100-1024_3-6035412.html (stating that the website had used 
“doorway pages” or false websites that enticed Google’s algorithm but redirected 
visitors to other pages). 
 127 Search King, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193, at *4 (stating that Google had 
“adversely impacted the business opportunities available to Search King . . . to an 
indeterminate degree by limiting their exposure on Google’s search engine”). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at *6. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at *8. 
 132 Id. at *11-12. 
 133 Id. at *13. 
 134 See KinderStart, http://www.kinderstart.com (last visited Feb. 25, 2008). 
 135 Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and Damages at ¶ 18, 
KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. C06-2057), 2006 WL 777064 
[hereinafter KinderStart Initial Complaint]. 
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to over ten million page views.136 With this amount of traffic, 
KinderStart.com was surely profiting substantially from 
AdSense. In March 2005, however, Google de-listed Kinder-
Start from its index and dropped KinderStart’s PageRank to 
zero.137 While KinderStart remained an AdSense partner, once 
Google stopped sending new traffic to the site, this reduced 
KinderStart’s AdSense revenues by eighty percent and its 
overall website traffic by seventy percent.138 These figures 
demonstrate the power that Google wields in the e-commerce 
marketplace. 
Google has never publicly explained why it reduced 
KinderStart’s PageRank. KinderStart claimed that it had 
never violated Google’s policies.139 However, it seems clear that 
the KinderStart de-listing and PageRank reduction were, like 
the actions taken against Search King, instances of targeted 
hand editing by Google employees based on some concern 
Google had about the company.  
KinderStart filed suit on March 17, 2006, with a class 
action complaint bringing claims on behalf of itself and 
similarly situated online businesses.140 It alleged seven counts 
of violations of common and statutory law, claiming, inter alia, 
that Google had abridged its rights to free speech, that Google 
had monopolized the online advertising market, that Google 
was guilty of unfair business practices, and that its “zero” 
PageRank constituted common law defamation and libel.141 
After an initial unfavorable ruling dismissing the complaint 
with leave to amend, KinderStart filed an amended complaint, 
adding a false advertising claim.142 
All KinderStart’s claims were ultimately dismissed.143 
Though the various claims failed for reasons grounded in the 
appropriate legal doctrines (for example, KinderStart’s federal 
  
 136 See id. at ¶ 17. 
 137 Id. at ¶ 50. 
 138 Id. at ¶¶ 26, 27. 
 139 Id. at ¶¶ 46-48. 
 140 Id. at 14-24. 
 141 Id. at 17-24.  
 142 First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and 
Damages at ¶¶ 28-29, KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. C06-
2057), 2006 WL 1435539. 
 143 KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82481, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. July 16, 2006).  
2008] GOOGLE’S LAW 1357 
 
and state free speech claims failed for a lack of state action144), 
the defamation and libel claim was resolved by court findings 
highly similar to those in the Search King litigation. The court 
stated that Google’s PageRanks were protected statements of 
opinion:  
PageRank is a creature of Google’s invention and does not constitute 
an independently-discoverable value. In fact, Google might choose to 
assign PageRanks randomly, whether as whole numbers or with 
many decimal places, but this would not create “incorrect” Page-
Ranks.145 
Though there will undoubtedly be future cases in the 
same vein as Search King and KinderStart, it seems that 
general challenges to the nature of Google’s results pages have 
little chance of succeeding under current law. If Google’s 
results are simply subjective opinions, then Google apparently 
has the right to structure its left-hand column in whatever way 
it pleases.146 With regard to the right-hand column, Google has 
stipulated in one lawsuit that it possesses the right to refuse to 
sell AdWords to anyone for any reason.147 
Many commentators, most notably Professor Eric Gold-
man, have argued that, from a policy perspective, this is the 
correct result. Goldman states that there is no compelling 
reason for the law to dictate how Google or other search 
engines structure their results pages.148 Though Goldman 
provides several justifications for the status quo, his primary 
argument is that market discipline will produce results that 
are superior to those produced by regulatory intervention.149 To 
the extent that Google’s results fail to serve the interests of the 
public, another search engine company will arise to entice 
  
 144 Id. at *1, 11-21 (dismissing claims in the First Amended Complaint); 
KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22637, at *39-52 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (dismissing claims in the Second Amended Complaint). 
 145  KinderStart.com, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22637, at *61. 
 146 See Pasquale, supra note 87, at 116 (noting the largely unrestrained power 
of Google and expressing concern over the dangers of First Amendment “absolutism”). 
 147 Uline, Inc. v. JIT Packaging, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d. 793, 799 (N.D. Ill. 
2006). In Langdon v. Google (discussed supra note 118), the court agreed with this 
argument. 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630 (D. Del. 2007); see also Frank Pasquale, Asterisk 
Revisited: Debating a Right of Reply on Search Results, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 61, 71-72 
(2008) (discussing Langdon).  
 148 Goldman, supra note 67, at 588-89, 591-96; Eric Goldman, Search Engine 
Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 188, 189 
(2006), available at http://www.yjolt.org/files/goldman-8-YJOLT-188.pdf (arguing that 
search engine bias “is both necessary and desirable.”). 
 149 See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 67, at 595-96. 
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users, thus allowing the market to fix the problem.150 Goldman 
fears that efforts to regulate search engines will lead to 
“regulatory distortion” that will undercut the efforts of search 
engines to improve relevancy.151 
Professors Oren Bracha and Frank Pasquale disagree 
with Goldman about the superior utility of market discipline.152 
In a forthcoming article, Bracha and Pasquale argue that 
search engine results are prone to various types of market 
failure that should be remedied through federal regulation.153 
One of their primary concerns, borne out by the cases above, is 
that Google’s rankings lack meaningful transparency and 
might be subject to abuse. In a weblog posting, Bracha 
compared the ranking power of search engines to “concentrated 
power that operates in the dark.”154 Bracha and Pasquale argue 
that the state should act to cure the failures of search engine 
results by requiring search engines to reveal their algo-
rithms.155 They further argue that the First Amendment, 
properly understood, should not serve as a shield protecting 
Google from relevancy regulation.156 
However, Bracha and Pasquale are (understandably) 
vague about exactly how they would like results to be 
regulated.157 They simply state that any solution will require 
“institutional arrangements” that “will have to be nuanced  
and somewhat complex.”158 One wonders how government 
regulators might be inclined to oversee the structure of search 
  
 150 Goldman, supra note 148, at 197 (“[S]earchers will shop around if they do 
not get the results they want, and this competitive pressure constrains search engine 
bias.”). 
 151 Id. at 199-200. 
 152 See Pasquale, supra note 87, at 117 (calling for increased legal regulation 
of search results); Pasquale & Bracha, supra note 115, at 4; see also Introna & 
Nissenbaum, supra note 4, at 19 (“Web search mechanisms are too important to be 
shaped by the marketplace alone.”).  
 153 Pasquale & Bracha, supra note 115. 
 154 Posting of Oren Bracha to Eric Goldman’s Technology & Marketing Law 
Blog, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2007/08/bracha_responds.htm (Aug. 11, 2007). 
 155 Pasquale & Bracha, supra note 115, at 54-55. 
 156 Id. at 49-52. 
 157 In a prior article, Professor Pasquale limited his regulatory proposal to 
results for trademarked goods and personal names. Pasquale, supra note 87, at 117 
n.7. The remainder of this Article discusses the trademark proposal. I discuss the 
relation of trademarks to personal names and digital information in Greg Lastowka, 
Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. REV. 41 (2007). 
 158 Pasquale & Bracha, supra note 115, at 60. 
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engine results pages for “cars,” “nike,” “mesothelioma lawyers,” 
“violent crime,” “map of Philadelphia,” or “phrogging.”159 
Whatever one thinks of the merits of calls for greater 
state involvement with search results, the notion of an FCC-
equivalent organization that oversees results generally seems 
like a distant prospect. At this point there seems little legal 
footing or focused political will that might support regulating 
Google’s results generally. I emphasize “generally” because 
within one particular category of search terms, search engine 
results have been and continue to be regulated. When users 
search for terms that correspond with recognizable trade-
marks, some courts have found that trademark law places 
limits on the shape of the results that search engines return.160 
Limiting the discussion of the legal regulation of search 
results to trademark law constitutes a concession to the power 
of “Google’s Law” in e-commerce today. While one might hope 
for a law that acts as a more general regulator of information 
practices like search results, trademark law is really not up to 
that task. The best that trademark law can offer is one means, 
within a very limited context, of curbing potential market 
abuses and unfair competition.  
B. Trademark Laws Old and New 
Google currently lists left-column results and sells right-
column advertisements for terms such as “nike,” “jr cigars,” 
“playboy,” “american airlines,” and “rescuecom.com.” All of 
these terms have trademark meanings. Users search for these 
terms in left-column results and Google profits from the sale of 
AdWords advertisements relating to these terms in its right 
column. Searchers go to Google looking for “nike” and Google 
sometimes directs (and is sometimes paid to direct) those 
searchers to parties other than Nike, Inc. Is this fair to the 
Nike company? That is the fundamental question raised by the 
current litigation against Google. As a legal matter, the answer 
to the question is currently not clear. 
Google’s policy concerning the right-column exploitation 
of trademark-significant terms like “nike” has changed over 
  
 159 Cf. Goldman, supra note 148, at 197 (“[R]egulatory solutions become a 
vehicle for normative views about what searchers should see—–or should want to see. 
How should we select among these normative views? What makes one bias better than 
the other?”). 
 160 Pasquale, supra note 87, at 119. 
1360 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:4 
time. Prior to 2004, Google had honored requests it received 
from certain trademark owners to prohibit competitors from 
bidding on advertising keyed to terms corresponding to trade-
marks. For instance, Google reportedly once refused to sell 
advertisements to eBay’s competitors on results pages for the 
term “eBay.”161 Advertisements for such terms were sold only to 
the companies that held the corresponding trademarks.162  
However, in 2004, shortly before making its initial 
public offering, Google decided to change its internal policy in 
the United States and Canada. It decided to allow bids for 
terms that corresponded with the names of brands. News 
reports at the time described this new policy as a legal 
“gambit.”163 Currently, Google informs trademark owners who 
complain about the practice that it will “not disable keywords 
in response to a trademark complaint.”164 It did not take long 
after this change in policy for trademark holders to bring suit. 
Within a few weeks, the insurance company GEICO sued 
Google for selling “geico” as a keyword.165 Since that time, there 
has been a steady stream of new litigation brought by trade-
mark holders against Google as well as against competitors 
who have bought AdWords placements from Google related to 
trademarked terms.166 
It is not at all clear how courts will ultimately decide 
these suits as a matter of trademark law. In order to under-
stand why the issue is complicated, it is necessary to lay out 
the history of trademark law, its limits and recent expansions, 
and its application to search engines over the last ten years or 
so. 
1. Traditional Trademark Law 
Though trademarks have existed since ancient times, 
modern trademark law has its roots in the protection of the 
  
 161 Stefanie Olsen, Google Plans Trademark Gambit, CNET NEWS, Apr. 13, 
2004, http://news.com.com/2100-1038_3-5190324.html. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Google, Inc. v. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory Inc., No. C 03-5340, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32450 at *5 (N.D. Cal. April 18, 2007). 
 165 Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 701 (E.D. Va. 
2004). Overture, the successor of GoTo.com, was sued by GEICO as well. Id. 
 166 See infra Part II.C. 
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marks of English and European guilds.167 Trade guilds stamped 
their marks of origin on goods and containers. The counter-
feiting of these marks was prohibited by common law courts 
pursuant to the law of deceit.168 False designations of origin 
deceived consumers about the quality of the products they 
purchased. This deception also harmed business reputations.  
As commercial trade expanded and the social distance 
between consumers and producers of goods increased, designa-
tions of source and origin became even more important. 
Consumers could not rely on personal relationships in the 
marketplace and increasingly needed to rely on trusted source 
identifications. Accordingly, trademark law grew increasingly 
detailed.169  
Today, in the United States, the federal Lanham Act is 
the primary source of trademark protection, though state 
common law and statutory protections are also available.170 
Most (if not all) commentators today consider United States 
trademark law as justified under an economic theory.171 The 
economic theory of trademark protection is largely a para-
phrase of historic statements from common law courts about 
the purposes served by trademarks.172 Historically, trademark 
law has two goals: the protection of business goodwill against 
  
 167 ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 154-55 (3d ed. 2000); Edward 
S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trademarks, 9 MICH. L. REV. 29, 32-33 
(1911). 
 168 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 5:2, at 5-3. (4th ed. 2008). 
 169 Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common 
Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1690 (1999) (“[E]conomists have pointed to the role of 
trademarks in allowing the growth of complex, long-term organizations spread over a 
wide geographic area.”). 
 170 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000). 
 171 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An 
Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-73 (1987); see also Barton Beebe, The 
Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623-24 (2004). 
 172 While the bulk of the historic rationale of trademark protection is retained 
in the translation to economic jargon, the match is not perfect. Something valuable is 
surely lost when the lens of economics is used exclusively as a means of understanding 
the social role of trademark law. Cf. Dinwoodie & Janis, Contextualism, supra note 70, 
at 1607 (noting how a focus on economics can obscure “humanist concerns about a 
materialist, consumptive society.”); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 201 (1971) 
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (“An affluent society ought not be miserly in support of 
justice, for economy is not an objective of the system.”). 
  I should note that not everyone agrees with the conventional wisdom that 
trademark law has historically pursued consumer protection goals. For an argument 
that contemporary theories are inconsistent with historical understandings, see Mark 
P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1839 (2007). 
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unfair misappropriation by competitors and the protection of 
consumers against marketplace deception.173  
Translated to popular law-and-economics terms, trade-
mark law remedies a potential market failure by generating 
limited property-like incentives for investments in the 
production of higher quality products. For example, protecting 
the Coca-Cola Company’s exclusive right to produce beverages 
bearing the Coca-Cola mark encourages the company that 
“owns” that mark to invest in ensuring that its products have a 
uniform high quality. If purchasers are pleased with the 
quality of Coca-Cola branded products, the company can raise 
prices for products bearing the mark and reap the benefits of 
investments in superior quality. This is understood to be 
preferable to a system where businesses lack such incentives 
and companies can copy each other’s designations of origin at 
will. 
Congruently, trademarks protect consumers. The eco-
nomic translation of this is that consumers benefit from both 
reliance on indicators of quality (as described above) and a 
reduction in “search costs” enabled by the legally-insured 
stability of trademark indicators. With regard to search costs, 
the general idea is that once a consumer finds a preferred 
brand (such as Coca-Cola) with qualities that the consumer 
finds acceptable, the consumer can rely on the source indicator 
in future purchases. The consumer need not fear that other 
products marked with that label are produced by a different 
company and need not spend additional time investigating that 
possibility. Because trademark law grants the trademark 
owner exclusive rights to the signifier, consumers can be 
confident it is the source of the product. This results in 
consumer savings of time expended in the marketplace. 
The traditional and economic theories of trademark are 
limited by these animating justifications. There is no reason 
the Coca-Cola Company should own any interest in the word 
“Coca-Cola” in the abstract. The social objectives of trademark 
law can be accomplished by allowing Coca-Cola to do no more 
  
 173 S. REP. NO. 1333, at 3 (1946) (“The purpose underlying any trade-mark 
statute is twofold. One is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in 
purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will 
get the product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a 
trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, 
he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.”); 
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (recognizing the 
same). 
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than prevent competitors from using the mark in a particular 
market. Although trademarks are often described as intellec-
tual property interests, they do not grant broad exclusionary 
rights, such as are enjoyed by owners of land or bank accounts. 
As the Senate report accompanying the passage of the Lanham 
Act put it, “Trade-marks are not monopolistic grants like 
patents and copyrights.”174 
Before a trademark owner can enjoin a given use, the 
owner has traditionally been required to demonstrate that the 
competitor’s use created a “likelihood of confusion” among 
consumers about the source or sponsorship of the defendant’s 
goods and services.175 Trademark infringement is established 
only if the defendant’s goods and services “would reasonably be 
thought by the buying public to come from the same source, or 
thought to be affiliated with, connected with, or sponsored by, 
the trademark owner.”176 Thus, each trademark infringement 
suit entails an inquiry into what is occurring in the minds of 
consumers with regard to a particular usage of a trademark 
signifier in a particular market.177 
The protection of trademarks is therefore strongly 
wedded to marketplace context. Indeed, in order for a trade-
mark to be protected at all, it must operate within a particular 
market.178 “Distinctiveness” means that the word or symbol 
claimed to be a trademark serves a trademark function. Only 
words and symbols that identify a specific commercial source 
are protected as trademarks. For instance, “Nike” would not be 
protectible as a trademark if used in relation to the sale of 
statues of a Greek goddess. The word would be understood to 
identify the product, not its source.  
Many well-known trademarks are only meaningful (in 
their trademarked sense) in particular marketplace settings. 
  
 174 S. REP. NO. 1333, at 3 (1946). 
 175 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 780 (1992). 
 176 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 168, § 24:6, at 24-16. 
 177 Courts use different multiple factor tests to determine whether confusion is 
likely, but most include factors such as the distinctiveness of the mark (how strongly it 
indicates a particular source), the similarity of the plaintiff’s mark and the allegedly 
infringing mark, the proximity of the markets in which the marks operate, the 
defendant’s intent in selecting the mark, and the evidence of actual confusion among 
consumers. See generally Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for 
Trademark Infringement, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1581 (2006) (explaining the way courts apply 
the factors). 
 178 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000) (“No trademark by which the goods of the 
applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registra- 
tion . . . .”). 
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The words “apple,” “caterpillar,” and “aspen” have natural 
meanings that predominate in conversation. Yet in some 
commercial contexts, consumers might associate those terms 
with brands of computers, construction equipment, and legal 
casebooks. However, the fact that trademarks protect those 
terms does not prohibit their use in the sale and marketing of 
apples, larval Lepidoptera, and certain trees of the willow 
family. In those marketplaces, the terms have no trademark 
significance or protection. 
Consider how this multiplicity of meaning plays out in 
the search engine context. The term “cars” has a significant 
non-trademark meaning. Yet in the example above, half of 
Google’s left column results related to a recent movie by 
Disney. This is not simply a trademark meaning of a term 
taking precedence over a standard meaning. In fact, it is one 
trademark meaning taking precedence over a standard 
meaning and multiple other trademark meanings as well. 
It is true that Disney has registered “Cars” as a 
trademark in a variety of markets.179 However, various other 
companies are also using “cars” as a trademark denoting the 
sources of, among other things, investment securities (Reg. No. 
2970658), database management services (Reg. No. 2802335), 
coupon distributions (Reg. No. 2462471), automobile restora-
tions (Reg. No. 3065082), and instructional reading evaluation 
materials (Reg. No. 2320672).180 And many other companies 
may also be using “cars” as an unregistered trademark in 
various other markets. These companies may also be able to 
obtain trademark protection under the Lanham Act.181  
The centrality of spatial and marketplace context to 
trademark law permits one term to be owned by multiple 
entities operating within separate markets.182 In addition to 
being used in multiple markets, trademarks may be used by 
multiple parties who operate independent businesses within 
non-overlapping geographic areas. Under common law rules, a 
  
 179 See U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 78978328 (for school supplies, clothing, and 
furniture). Technically, this Disney registration is limited to the movie logo, not the 
word “cars.” Id. 
 180 Though it is not certain that all these registrations would be upheld if they 
were asserted in litigation, courts would award them a presumption of validity due to 
their federal registration. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2006).  
 181 See id. § 1125(a). 
 182 Dinwoodie & Janis, Contextualism, supra note 70, at 1658-59 (explaining 
the importance of context to trademark law); Goldman, supra note 67, at 592 (“[M]any 
trademarked words can have multiple trademark owners . . . .”). 
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junior (latter in time) user of a trademark may still claim 
exclusive rights to use a mark within the geographical area 
where the prior senior user of the mark did not expand.183 So an 
identical mark might be used in an identical market, for 
example, by two different companies operating in Maine and 
California. Where the markets are geographically separate, 
these concurrent uses may be permitted because it cannot be 
demonstrated that consumers in either market will be confused 
about the origins of goods or services. 
Offline, given the abundant contextual clues that 
consumers are able to access, there are relatively few diffi-
culties encountered in reconciling legitimate infringement 
claims, common non-trademark usages, separate geographic 
uses, and usages by multiple trademark owners in various 
markets. “Playboy” yams and sweet potatoes are unlikely to 
confuse consumers into believing that the yam farmers have a 
side business in adult entertainment.184 And even in instances 
where consumers may be confused, traditional trademark 
doctrine allows defendants to make fair use of trademarks 
where, for instance, business competitors use a trademark for 
comparative purposes.185 
Search terms are obviously different. While the term 
“coke” means one thing in a supermarket, another in a steel 
manufacturing plant, another for a student of the history of 
common law,186 and still another thing in the drug trade, it is a 
single search term. Google’s current technology lacks signifi-
cant contextual cues and therefore it struggles to make a single 
page of results respond to the needs of users searching for 
divergent meanings of a term.187 Of course, in attempting to do 
  
 183 United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918); Grupo 
Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 184 U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 73799881 (for fresh yams and fresh sweet 
potatoes). According to the company’s website, the brand name was chosen back when 
“a playboy was a classy, outgoing kind of guy, not what you think of today.” History of 
the Wayne E. Bailey Produce Company, http://www.sweetpotatoes.com/Default.aspx? 
tabid=65 (last visited Sept. 1, 2007). 
 185 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 
122 (2004). 
 186 See EDWARD COKE, THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR 
EDWARD COKE (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003). 
 187 See Goldman, supra note 67, at 521-24 (discussing the “objective 
opaqueness” of search engine queries). There is some context in a Google search. With 
regard to AdWords, Google does offer “localized” AdWords targeting that offers results 
in particular geographic locations. Additionally, a user can create needed context by 
lengthening a query string, e.g., entering “nike mythology” or “aspen trees.” However, 
as Professor Goldman notes, “most searchers use no more than two keywords.” Id. at 
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this, it cannot make everyone happy—some users are bound to 
be disappointed that Google has not given priority to their 
intended meaning of a term. 
Individuals who may be searching for “playboy” yams or 
“cars” investment securities will likely be disappointed by what 
they find in Google’s search results. Without context, popu-
larity and commercial sway tend to prevail. Traditional trade-
mark law by no means would dictate that a single trademark 
meaning should precede other trademark and non-trademark 
meanings in a situation devoid of any particular marketplace 
context.188 
Indeed, under a traditional trademark analysis, it 
should be hard to see exactly how or why trademark owners 
should have an ability to influence Google’s search results. 
Given the lack of context accompanying a search term, it is not 
clear what any given user is seeking when making a search for 
“nike” or “cars.” While the results of a search inquiry may be 
frustrating when they fail to produce the desired results, 
Google’s users would not be confused as to the origin of goods if, 
when reviewing search listings for “coke” and “apple,” they 
found information about carbon residue and fruit rather than 
makers of cola and computers.189  
However, the traditional theories described so far do not 
tell the whole story of trademark law today. Trademark law 
has expanded in the past half-century in terms of the scope of 
rights granted to trademark holders. It has also responded 
quite dramatically in response to online technologies.  
2. Recent Doctrinal Expansions in Trademark Rights 
Traditional theories of trademark law have been partly 
usurped today by recent judicial and legislative expansions of 
trademark rights.190 While the doctrinal expansion of trade-
mark protection has manifested itself in a variety of ways, this 
section will briefly introduce two of the most significant 
expansions: trademark dilution and the doctrine of initial 
interest confusion. 
  
516. It is also possible that “personalized search” will eventually increase the 
contextual cues Google can bring to search queries. See Goldman, supra note 148, at 
198-99 (discussing personalized search).  
 188 See Goldman, supra note 67, at 509 (“[T]rademark law could jeopardize the 
Internet’s potential as an information resource . . . .”). 
 189 Id. at 592. 
 190 Lemley, supra note 169, at 1687-88. 
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a. Dilution 
The idea of dilution protection originated in a 1927 law 
review article written by Frank I. Schechter.191 Dilution’s 
controversial innovation is that it protects marks without  
the need for plaintiffs to demonstrate consumer confusion. 
Dilution, according to Schechter, should protect against the 
weakening of a trademark’s power to identify a source.192 
Schechter warned against a “gradual whittling away or dis-
persion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the 
mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods.”193 He 
argued that certain famous trademarks had inherent value 
that required protection without regard to consumer confu-
sion.194 Though Schechter’s article was certainly the origin of 
the trademark dilution concept, it wasn’t until 1947 (the year 
the Lanham Act went into effect) that the first state 
legislatively adopted Schechter’s dilution theory.195 It was not 
until 1996 that a federal dilution bill was passed.196 
Historically, state and federal courts have struggled to 
grasp the concept of dilution.197 Some courts have explicitly 
criticized dilution as potentially extending unjustifiable “rights 
in gross” to trademark holders.198 When the United States 
Supreme Court took its first decision addressing the dilution 
statute, Moseley v. Victoria’s Secret, it effectively eviscerated 
the federal dilution law by imposing an almost impossible 
evidentiary burden on plaintiffs.199 However, in 2006, Congress 
  
 191 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. 
L. REV. 813 (1927), reprinted in 60 TRADEMARK REP. 334 (1970). 
 192 See generally Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. 
Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999) (explaining the history of the 
dilution statute). 
 193 Schechter, supra note 191, at 342. 
 194 Id.  
 195 Arguably, the dilution statutes adopted were not very faithful to 
Schechter’s original concept, but an explanation of that point is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 196 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 
Stat. 985, 985-96 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)). 
 197 Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(applying state dilution law and noting that “dilution . . . remains a somewhat 
nebulous concept”); Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1062 (2005) 
(“Courts have struggled, and continue to struggle, to identify the harm dilution law is 
trying to prevent.”). 
 198 Ringling Bros.,170 F.3d at 458. 
 199 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003) (“[A]ctual 
dilution must be established.”). The impossibility of establishing “actual dilution” was 
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legislatively reversed the Moseley decision and reanimated the 
near-dead doctrine.200 It did so with the Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act (“TDRA”), amending the statutory weakness the 
Supreme Court had seized upon in Moseley.201 Yet the revision 
has essentially just forced dilution back onto the plate of the 
courts, doing little to clarify its nature or the basis for its 
inclusion in trademark law. 
Under the TDRA, there are now two federal types of 
dilution harms. Both of these formulations are based on prior 
state doctrines of dilution. “Dilution by blurring” is established 
where the plaintiff can demonstrate an “association arising 
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a 
famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous 
mark.”202 An example of blurring would be a “Rolls Royce” 
toothbrush. Even if consumers are unlikely to believe that the 
owner of the Rolls Royce trademark for autos actually 
manufactures or sponsors a line of toothbrushes, dilution law 
allows the trademark owner to enjoin the toothbrush maker 
from using the mark. The Schechterian justification is that 
associating toothbrushes with “Rolls Royce” leads to the 
“whittling away” of the distinctive Rolls Royce signifier. Yet 
courts have also seemed to see dilution’s goal as prohibiting 
commercial actors from “free riding” on the value created by 
trademarks.203 
“Dilution by tarnishment,” the other TDRA form of 
dilution, takes place where there is an “association arising from 
the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous 
mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark.”204 
Perhaps the classic textbook example of tarnishment is the 
(pre-Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”)) case of Coca-
Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., where a court enjoined the sale 
  
largely due to the fact that nobody knows exactly what dilution is or how it might 
create a quantifiable economic harm. 
 200 See Long, supra note 197, at 1075 (explaining how the Moseley limitation 
on dilution was the culmination of a “bottom-up phenomenon”). 
 201 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee. Inc., 477 F.3d 765, 766 (2d Cir. 
2007) (stating that the Moseley standard no longer applies); Eldorado Stone, LLC v. 
Renaissance Stone, Inc., No. 04-2562, 2007 WL 2403572 at *5 (S.D. Cal 2007) (applying 
the post-Moseley relaxed standard and finding plaintiff’s famous “CLIFFSTONE” and 
“RUSTIC LEDGE” marks were diluted by defendant’s actions). 
 202 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2000). 
 203 Long, supra note 197, at 1059 (2005) (identifying “free riding” as a harm 
independent of blurring). 
 204 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (2000). 
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of posters in the style of the Coca-Cola trademark bearing the 
words “Enjoy Cocaine.”205  
Though the district court in Gemini Rising nodded to 
traditional trademark theories by asserting that consumers 
could be confused about the sponsorship of the posters, the 
opinion seemed to hinge on the sense that the Coca-Cola mark 
itself was being harmed by the poster. (Interestingly, however, 
Justice Holmes once opined for the Supreme Court that Coca-
Cola’s “goodwill” had been helped by the inclusion of cocaine in 
its formula.206) The Gemini Rising case also highlights common 
concerns that, by extending trademark protections beyond the 
need to prevent consumers from commercial deception, dilution 
law may improperly impinge upon free expression. 
Dilution law, currently re-invigorated by the TDRA’s 
blurring and tarnishment provisions, makes it hard to say that 
trademarks are limited rights used exclusively to prevent 
consumer confusion. By removing the solicitude for consumer 
interests from trademark law, dilution unhinges traditional 
theories and threatens to transform trademark law into a 
regime of word ownership. If dilution law becomes more 
powerful under the TDRA, a regime of search term ownership 
may not be inconceivable.207 
b. Initial Interest Confusion 
With respect to search engines, however, a more signi-
ficant recent expansion of trademark law is the doctrine of 
initial interest confusion.208 Traditionally, and not surprisingly, 
most courts have focused analysis of consumer confusion on the 
time period proximate to consumer purchases.209 The doctrine of 
initial interest confusion shifts the focus of confusion analysis 
  
 205 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1188 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
 206 Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of America, 254 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1920) 
(Holmes, J.) (“Before 1900 the beginning of [Coca-Cola’s] good will was more or less 
helped by the presence of cocaine . . . . The amount seems to have been very small, but 
it may have been enough to begin a bad habit . . . .”). 
 207  In 2007, Utah actually enacted its own version of this regime, though the 
future of the legislation is dubious. 2007 Utah Laws 365 (codified in various sections of 
title 70-3a); see Ameet Sachdev, Trademark Battlefield, CHI. TRIB., May 2, 2007, at C1. 
 208 See generally Jennifer Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the 
Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105 (2005) (explaining the 
historical roots and contemporary expansion of the doctrine). 
 209 See Marshall Leaffer, Sixty Years of the Lanham Act: The Decline and 
Demise of Monopoly Phobia, in U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 85, 127-
30 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 2006). 
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to at a time prior to the time of purchase. Initial interest con-
fusion can be found to exist even if confusion was not present 
at the time of purchase.  
Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books210 is a well-
known Ninth Circuit case applying the doctrine. The plaintiff 
in the case owned the copyright and trademark rights in the 
well-known children’s book, The Cat in the Hat. The defendant, 
Penguin Books, had published The Cat NOT in the Hat! A 
Parody by Dr. Juice, a book that consisted of a “rhyming 
summary of highlights from the O.J. Simpson double murder 
trial.”211 From a distance, the plaintiff claimed, consumers 
might become initially interested in the parody book due to the 
cover’s resemblance to the other books bearing the trademarks 
of the plaintiff. 
Affirming the preliminary injunction entered against 
the defendant, the Ninth Circuit stated that “the use of the 
Cat’s stove-pipe hat or the confusingly similar title to capture 
initial consumer attention, even though no actual sale is finally 
completed as a result of the confusion, may be still an 
infringement.”212 The court also seemed censorious of what it 
saw as a opportunistic use of the plaintiff’s trademarks to 
generate consumer interest, stating that the defendants’ “likely 
intent in selecting the Seuss marks was to draw consumer 
attention to what would otherwise be just one more book on the 
O.J. Simpson murder trial.”213 Like the Gemini Rising case, the 
Dr. Seuss case highlights the way that expansions beyond 
traditional trademark protections threaten limitations on the 
permissible scope of public speech.  
Though not all federal circuits have endorsed the 
doctrine of initial interest confusion, and the Supreme Court 
has yet to consider a case applying it, many courts have 
accepted and applied the doctrine.214 As Professor Jennifer 
Rothman has noted in a recent article, there is only a tenuous 
  
 210 Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 
1997). 
 211 Id. at 1396. 
 212 Id. at 1405. 
 213 Id. 
 214 See, e.g., Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812-13 
(7th Cir. 2002); Checkpoint Sys. v. Check Point Software Tech., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 293 
(3d Cir. 2001); Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Cf. 
Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 316 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e have never adopted the 
initial interest confusion theory.”). According to Professor Rothman, as of 2005, only 
the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits had endorsed the doctrine. 
See Rothman, supra note 208, at 108 n.8.  
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connection between initial interest confusion and the tradi-
tional rationale of trademark law.215 Indeed, there are potential 
anti-competitive and anti-consumer effects that flow from 
rights to police confusion outside the context of an actual 
sale.216  
In summary, the rights of trademark owners have 
expanded considerably in recent decades to extend to situations 
where consumers are not confused and/or where confusion 
exists outside the context of a sale. These expansions have 
allowed trademark law’s scope of protection to drift far afield.217 
It is in this unstable legal context that Google’s AdWords sales 
practices are being challenged. 
C. Trademarks and Search Results 
As explained, there are significant mismatches between 
traditional trademarks and search terms. However, given 
dilution’s under-theorized solicitude for trademark owners and 
initial interest confusion’s expanded scope of relevant con-
sumer confusion, Google’s practice of profiting from the sale of 
trademark-significant terms might conceivably be found to be 
an infringing act. Ironically, the decisions that now may 
provide a basis for policing Google’s commercial conduct in its 
right-hand column were issued in instances where courts were 
attempting, in part, to protect the integrity of the left-hand 
column against what might be described as abusive SEO.218 
1. Meta Tags 
The earliest case law on search engines involved 
litigation over HTML “meta tags.”219 Though more sophisticated 
methods of Web design are commonly used today, Web pages 
were originally created in a computer language called HTML 
  
 215 Rothman, supra note 208, at 190 (“Initial interest confusion is . . . an 
excess, and one which, despite violating the express terms of the Lanham Act, thus far 
has been extremely successful.”). 
 216 Id. 
 217 Lemley, supra note 169, at 1688 (“[Contemporary] changes have loosed 
trademark law from its traditional economic moorings and have offered little of 
substance to replace them.”). 
 218 See Grimmelmann, supra note 85, at 31 (describing meta tags as an early 
form of SEO). 
 219 See Lastowka, supra note 7, at 836 n.6 (collecting decisions from 1997 to 
1999). 
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(an acronym for “hyper-text markup language”).220 The meta 
tag is a feature of HTML that originated around 1995 as way to 
provide information about pages that would not be presented in 
the page as displayed.221 Though meta tags come in a variety of 
flavors, it was the “keyword” tag that prompted litigation. The 
keyword meta tag communicates with search engines. It is 
used by Web page authors to identify terms they believe are 
relevant to their Web pages.222 
Many Web pages still feature keyword meta tags today. 
The website of the New York Times, for instance, declares that 
it is properly associated with roughly a hundred search terms, 
including “daily newspaper,” “national,” “politics,” “Mets,” “NY 
Yankees,” and “obituaries.”223 YouTube, on the other hand, 
claims in its meta tags that it is relevant to just four keyword 
terms: “video,” “sharing,” “camera phone,” and “video phone.”224 
At one point, search engines paid attention to keyword 
meta tags. Pages that claimed to be about “nike,” for instance, 
would be ranked higher in searches for that term. But today, 
the majority of search engines ignore meta tags.225 This is 
undoubtedly because meta tags permitted Web designers to 
engage in a simple form of abusive SEO. For instance, unscrup-
ulous website owners noticing the high traffic for certain 
search terms such as “mp3” or “Princess Diana” could once 
benefit from placing those terms in their keyword tags, despite 
the fact that their sites contained no information relevant to 
either term. This tactic, known as “spamdexing,” could drive 
traffic to the meta tag manipulator, but confounded search 
engine users looking for information about Princess Diana.226 
  
 220 HTML is not a programming language, but a “markup language” that 
instructs Web browsers on how to display Web pages. As an example, a “<p>” tag 
instructs a browser to start a new paragraph and an “<a href>” tag indicates that the 
Web browser should generate a hyperlink. 
 221 E-mail from Dave Ragget, World Wide Web Consortium Fellow, to Greg 
Lastowka (Sept. 6, 1999) (on file with author). Dave Ragget was one of the original 
drafters of HTML. Dave Ragget’s home page can be found at http://www.w3.org/People/ 
Raggett/. 
 222 See generally Lastowka, supra note 7 (describing meta tags more fully). 
 223 New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2007). (In 
order to see the meta tags, select “view source” from your Web browser and look for 
“meta name = ‘keywords’”). 
 224 YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2007). 
 225 Though the vast majority of web crawlers grant keyword meta tags no 
special relevance, they may continue to influence search engine relevance ranking 
simply due to the fact that they appear near the top of the HTML text of a page. 
 226 Lastowka, supra note 7, at 865-68 (discussing spamdexing). 
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Even though search engine companies were victims of 
meta tag abuse, they did not participate in meta tag litigation. 
Spamdexing was understood by them as a systemic and 
technological problem to be addressed by technological fixes, 
like PageRank, rather than by myriad lawsuits against Web 
authors. Meta tag litigation was a path instead pursued by 
trademark owners who brought complaints against their rival 
competitors.227 
For example, in the 1998 case of Playboy Enterprises v. 
AsiaFocus International, Playboy sued a competitor in the 
“adult entertainment” market that had used “playboy” and 
“playmate” as keyword meta tags.228 Though there were various 
other bases for trademark claims, the court highlighted the use 
of keyword meta tags as a “deceptive tactic.”229 Other cases 
decided in the late 1990s shared this view, finding that 
defendants who used the trademarks of their competitors in 
keyword meta tags were competing unfairly.230 In many of these 
early cases, it seemed that both lawyers and judges were 
struggling with the basic technology of Web search. 
In 1999, the Ninth Circuit made a substantial innova-
tion in the first meta tag case to be decided by a circuit court of 
appeals, Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entertain-
ment Corp.231 Brookfield and West Coast Video were competing 
claimants to the trademark “moviebuff.”232 Both intended to  
use the mark in marketing and sales efforts on the Web.233 
After first finding that Brookfield was the rightful owner of 
“moviebuff” in this market, the court considered whether West 
  
 227 Id. at 874-77 (discussing competitor lawsuits). 
 228 Playboy Enters. v. AsiaFocus Int’l, Inc., No. 97-734-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 10359, at *7-8 (E.D. Va. Feb. 2, 1998). 
 229 Id. at *8 (“The defendants have purposefully employed deceptive tactics to 
attract consumers to their Web site under the guise that their sites are sponsored by or 
somehow affiliated with PEI . . . . [A] consumer conducting a search for PEI’s Web site 
by typing in the trademark ‘Playboy’ or ‘Playmate’ would receive a search engine-
generated list which included the asian-playmates Web site.” (citations omitted)). 
 230 See N.Y. State Soc’y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., 79 
F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (ruling in favor of plaintiff); SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. 
Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (ruling in favor of plaintiff); Playboy Enters. v. Calvin 
Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (ruling in favor of plaintiff). But see 
Patmont Motor Werks v. Gateway Marine, 1997 WL 811770 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1997) 
(ruling for defendant because plaintiff had failed to explain how keyword meta tags 
work). 
 231 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 232 Id. at 1041-42. 
 233 Id. at 1042. 
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Coast’s use of “moviebuff” in its keyword meta tags amounted 
to trademark infringement.234 
Under a traditional trademark infringement analysis, 
this seemed unlikely. Though some courts prior to 1999 had 
found that meta tags contributed to a likelihood of confusion, 
often other factual circumstances supported liability.235 The 
Ninth Circuit, by comparison, considered the meta tag question 
exclusive of other issues. Applying the traditional analysis,  
the Brookfield court found that confusion was unlikely. It 
would not be reasonable for a search engine user to believe that 
West Coast’s website was sponsored by Brookfield simply 
because it appeared in the results listing for “moviebuff.”236 
Yet by applying the doctrine of initial interest confusion, 
the Ninth Circuit found that West Coast’s use of the meta tag 
unfairly diverted consumers searching for Brookfield’s products 
toward West Coast’s products.237 The court famously analogized 
West Coast’s use of the “moviebuff” keyword meta tag to a 
deceptive billboard directing travelers to exit a highway at the 
wrong place.238 This billboard analogy has been extensively 
criticized and for good reason.239  
  
 234 Id. at 1053, 1061-66. 
 235 For instance, in some cases a plaintiff’s trademark would appear not just 
in meta tags but in the text of websites or advertisements, making the use of meta tags 
simply a factor in finding that the defendant had created a likelihood of consumer 
confusion. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. AsiaFocus Int’l, Inc., No. Civ.A. 97-734-A, 
1998 WL 724000, at *3 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998). 
 236 Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. at 1064. The court stated:  
Using another’s trademark in one’s metatags is much like posting a sign with 
another’s trademark in front of one’s store. Suppose West Coast’s competitor 
(let’s call it “Blockbuster”) puts up a billboard on a highway reading “West 
Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at Exit 7” where West Coast is really located at 
Exit 8 but Blockbuster is located at Exit 7. Customers looking for West 
Coast’s store will pull off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it. Unable to 
locate West Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right by the highway 
entrance, they may simply rent there. Even consumers who prefer West 
Coast may find it not worth the trouble to continue searching for West Coast 
since there is a Blockbuster right there. Customers are not confused in the 
narrow sense: they are fully aware that they are purchasing from 
Blockbuster and they have no reason to believe that Blockbuster is related to, 
or in any way sponsored by, West Coast. Nevertheless, the fact that there is 
only initial consumer confusion does not alter the fact that Blockbuster would 
be misappropriating West Coast’s acquired goodwill. 
Id. 
 239 See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 67, at 565, 570-73 (“[T]he Brookfield case 
took an already unclear IIC doctrine and threw it into chaos.”). 
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Search engine users were not, in fact, being misdirected 
into traveling to West Coast Video’s website. There was 
nothing in the facts that suggested West Coast’s listings in the 
search results were not truthfully labeled. Hence, the deceptive 
billboard that the court envisioned was more properly under-
stood as an accurate billboard. Second, even if some confusion 
existed, users diverted to West Coast Video’s site when 
searching for Brookfield might easily click back to the original 
results listing in a second. Comparing that type of diversion to 
exiting a highway and searching in vain for the wrong business 
was overstating the severity of the problem.240 Yet, despite the 
weakness of the analogy, Brookfield was perceived as a sound 
rule with regard to meta tags by many courts.241 
Defendants in meta tag cases have prevailed at times, 
however. While no Ninth Circuit case has overruled Brookfield, 
prior and subsequent decisions allowed some defendants to 
make fair use of meta tags corresponding to the trademarks 
owned by plaintiffs. For instance, the district court case Bally 
Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, decided a year before the 
Ninth Circuit’s Brookfield decision, upheld a defendant’s use of 
the plaintiff’s trademark in keyword meta tags.242 Faber had 
created a website featuring his many complaints about the 
plaintiff’s health club and used the word “Bally” in his meta 
tags.243 
The court rejected Bally’s attempt to enjoin Faber’s use 
of the term in his meta tags, explaining that Faber had a 
protected interest in reaching the public: 
[T]he average Internet user may want to receive all the information 
available on Bally . . . . This individual will be unable to locate sites 
containing outside commentary unless those sites include Bally’s 
marks in the machine readable code upon which search engines 
rely.244 
  
 240 Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 320 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“The harm 
caused by a misleading billboard on the highway is difficult to correct. In contrast, on 
the information superhighway, resuming one’s search for the correct website is 
relatively simple. With one click of the mouse and a few seconds delay, a viewer can 
return to the search engine’s results and resume searching for the original website.”). 
 241 See, e.g., Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 813 (7th 
Cir. 2002); Checkpoint Sys. Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 293 
(3d Cir. 2001); Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 319-20. 
 242 Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1167-68 
(C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 243 Id. at 1162. 
 244 Id. at 1165 (footnote omitted). 
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Bally had also claimed trademark dilution under the 
FTDA (the predecessor of the current TDRA). However, these 
claims were dismissed on the premise that “courts have held 
that trademark owners may not quash unauthorized use of the 
mark by a person expressing a point of view.”245 The Bally court 
cited a pre-FTDA decision from the First Circuit stating, “The 
Constitution does not . . . permit the range of the anti-dilution 
statute to encompass the unauthorized use of a trademark in a 
non-commercial setting such as an editorial or artistic 
context.”246 
The reasoning of the Bally decision was echoed in a 
post-Brookfield case decided by the Ninth Circuit, Playboy 
Enterprises v. Welles.247 The defendant was a former Playboy 
model who had used the word “playboy” in her meta tags. 
Though the Welles court did not reference the Bally case, it 
found that the defendant had used her meta tag keywords to 
accurately describe the contents of her website.248 The Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that forcing Welles to avoid the term 
“playboy” “would be particularly damaging in the Internet 
search context.”249 Again, the logic seemed to be that Welles had 
a right to have her website appear under the term “playboy” 
because her site was relevant to users searching for that term. 
Doctrinally, Welles avoided the Brookfield outcome by relying 
on Ninth Circuit doctrines of trademark fair use to bar 
Playboy’s claims of trademark infringement.250 
Keyword meta tag litigation continues to this day.251 
However, with the arrival of the Google AdWords business 
model at the turn of the century, competitors no longer needed 
to exclusively employ SEO tactics to appear high in the left 
column. They could buy their way into the right column 
instead. Rather than using meta tags, competitors began to pay 
  
 245 Id. at 1167. 
 246 Id. (quoting L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 
1987)). 
 247 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002).  
 248 Id. at 803-04. 
 249 Id. at 804. 
 250 Id. at 804-05. 
 251 See, e.g., FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. FragranceX.com, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 
545 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Pop Warner Little Scholars v. N.H. Youth Football & Spirit 
Conference, No. 06-cv-98-SM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64762 (D.N.H. Sept 11, 2006). 
Given the technological status quo, it is something of a puzzle why meta tag litigation 
is still ongoing. See Posting of Eric Goldman to Technology & Marketing Law Blog, 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/09/outdated_metata.htm (Sept. 25, 2006) (last 
visited Sept. 1, 2007) (expressing befuddlement over continuing meta tag litigation). 
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Google and other search companies to appear in advertise-
ments keyed to results. So if trademark infringement liability 
attached to West Coast Video for using a “moviebuff” meta tag 
to divert search engine users toward its website, could West 
Coast Video avoid liability if it obtained the same results by 
purchasing “moviebuff” AdWords advertisements?  
2. Playboy v. Netscape 
The most significant early case against search engines 
for search term sales was Playboy Enterprises v. Netscape 
Communications Corp., which ultimately led to a decision by 
the Federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.252 The 
defendant in the case, Netscape, had sold space for banner 
advertisements that were categorically “keyed” to certain 
groups of search terms.253 This was slightly different than 
Google’s current AdWords model, in that Netscape’s search 
engine required advertisers to purchase placement in large 
pools of search terms rather than allowing the purchase of 
specific terms.  
A familiar plaintiff in search engine cases, Playboy, 
objected to Netscape’s sale of banner advertisement placements 
in the category of adult entertainment. There were over 400 
sex-related terms in the category, but included among them 
were “playboy” and “playmate.”254 When “playboy” or “play-
mate” was entered into the search engine, an adult entertain-
ment category banner was displayed above the search results. 
Playboy brought suit against Netscape, alleging trademark 
  
 252 Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp. (Netscape II), 354 F.3d 1020 
(9th Cir. 2004). There was actually one earlier decision to consider the issue: Nissan 
Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp. 204 F.R.D. 460 (C.D. Cal. 2001). The case is a 
well-known domain name dispute; Nissan Motor Company sought to recover the 
“nissan.com” domain name from the Nissan Computer Corporation. However, the claim 
was ultimately unsuccessful. The defendant’s given name was Uzi Nissan and he has 
been using his surname in relation to his businesses since 1980. Id. at 461. 
  During the course of the litigation, the defendant sought to amend its 
counterclaims to allege trademark infringement on the basis that Nissan Motor 
Company had purchased placement under the terms “Nissan” and “Nissan.com” from 
certain search engines. The district court saw no reason why existing meta tag cases 
should not be extended to situations where companies purchased search engine 
placement. However, the court found that the claims were unsupportable in the case: 
Nissan Motor Company could purchase keywords congruent with trademark law 
because it owned trademark rights in the “Nissan” mark. Id. at 465-66. Mr. Nissan’s 
side of the story is recounted on his website. Nissan Computer Corp., http://www 
.nissan.com/Digest/The_Story.php (last visited Sept. 1, 2007). 
 253 Netscape II, 354 F.3d at 1022-23. 
 254 Id. at 1023. 
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infringement and dilution.255 Netscape prevailed at the district 
court level, but that decision was reversed by the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.256 Both opinions are helpful in seeing the key 
arguments that continue to characterize the current litigation 
over search engine results. 
In two opinions, the district court first denied Playboy’s 
request for a preliminary injunction257 and then later granted 
summary judgment to the defendants.258 Its analysis began 
with the conclusion that the defendants had not used the 
“playboy” trademark in commerce. The court stated: 
[I]t is undisputed that an Internet user cannot conduct a search 
using the trademark form of the words, i.e., Playboy® and 
Playmate®. Rather, the user enters the generic word “playboy” or 
“playmate.” It is also undisputed that the words “playboy” and 
“playmate” are English words in their own right, and that there exist 
other trademarks on the words wholly unrelated to PEI. Thus, 
whether the user is looking for goods and services covered by PEI’s 
trademarks or something altogether unrelated to PEI is anybody’s 
guess.259 
The court distinguished the situation in Brookfield on 
the basis that “moviebuff,” unlike “playboy,” was not “an 
English word in its own right,” and therefore had no significant 
non-trademark meaning.260 The court feared that if it equated 
the “playboy” search term with the plaintiff’s trademark rights, 
this would be tantamount to granting the plaintiff the ability to 
“remove a word from the English language.”261 Because it 
believed that “playboy” as a search term could not be equated 
with “playboy” as a trademark, the district court found that 
Playboy had not “shown that defendants use the terms in their 
trademark form” and therefore there was no commercial use of 
  
 255 Id. at 1022. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp. (Netscape I), 55 F. Supp. 2d 
1070 (C.D. Cal.), aff’d, 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 258 Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., No. SA CV 99-320, 2000 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 13418 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2000), rev’d, Netscape II, 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
 259 Netscape I, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1073. 
 260 Id. at 1074. 
 261 Id. Tackling the Brookfield billboard metaphor, the district court made a 
further distinction. It suggested that the Netscape analysis was somewhat different 
than the Brookfield analysis because a single entity (Netscape) controlled the “land” on 
which both the trademark holder and the competitor had placed their businesses and 
advertisements, respectively. Id. at 1075.  
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the Playboy trademarks.262 It dismissed the claims for both 
infringement and dilution.263 
In its numbered findings of fact, the district court went 
further in defense of Netscape’s practices. It explained that 
multiple trademark owners claim rights to the “playboy” and 
“playmate” marks, including a producer of yams and sweet 
potatoes.264 Citing to Bally and Welles, it noted that numerous 
cases had allowed trademarks to be “used” without the consent 
of trademark holders.265 Citing Faber, the court found that 
permitting Playboy to “monopolize” the use of the terms 
“playboy” and “playmate” would violate the First Amendment 
rights of (1) the defendants, (2) the other holders of “playboy” 
and “playmate” trademarks, and (3) “members of the public 
who conduct internet searches.”266 
The district court opinion in Netscape, had it been 
upheld on appeal and followed by other circuits, would have 
likely resolved the intersection of trademark law and search 
engines once and for all—in favor of search engines. However, 
four years later, the district court decision was reversed by the 
Ninth Circuit.267  
The Ninth Circuit considered itself bound by the logic of 
the Brookfield case.268 Applying the theory of initial interest 
confusion from Brookfield, the court found that search engine 
users were being diverted toward the websites of advertisers 
through the use of the term “playboy” in its trademark sense: 
“In this case, PEI claims that defendants, in conjunction with 
advertisers, have misappropriated the goodwill of [Playboy’s] 
marks by leading Internet users to competitors’ websites just 
as West Coast video misappropriated the goodwill of Brook-
field’s mark.”269  
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the reliance of the 
district court on the various meanings, multiple trademark 
ownerships, and potential fair uses of the term “playboy.” The 
Ninth Circuit found that “to argue that they use the marks for 
  
 262 Id. at 1073. 
 263 Id. at 1089. 
 264 Id. at 1079. 
 265 Id. at 1081. 
 266 Id. at 1085. 
 267 Netscape II, 354 F.3d 1020, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that genuine 
issues of material fact precluded summary judgment for the defendants). The case was 
settled in 2004 and did not proceed to trial. 
 268 Id. at 1025. 
 269 Id. 
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their primary meaning, as defendants did below, is absurd.”270 
Apparently due to the concession of the defendants that “they 
use the marks for their secondary [trademark] meanings,”271 
there was “no dispute” that the defendants had “used the 
marks in commerce.”272 The court found “farfetched” the notion 
that the defendant’s use of the term “playboy” was not a 
trademark use.273  
Applying Brookfield and the dilution analysis under the 
federal statute, the court found that Playboy had introduced 
enough evidence to raise substantial issues of fact as to 
whether the defendants’ use of the “playboy” and “playmate” 
search terms had created a likelihood of initial interest 
confusion and dilution.274 One potentially important fact was 
that some banners displayed contained no text. The court 
determined that “[s]ome consumers, initially seeking PEI’s 
sites, may initially believe that unlabeled banner advertise-
ments are links to PEI’s sites or to sites affiliated with PEI.”275 
Playboy had introduced evidence that consumers were more 
likely to believe that “relevant” banner advertisements (that is, 
unlabeled sexual images) were sponsored by Playboy than they 
were to believe that “random, un-targeted” advertisements (for 
example, car insurance advertisements) were affiliated with 
Playboy.276 Applying the reasoning of Brookfield, the Ninth 
Circuit in Netscape determined that Netscape’s diversion of 
internet traffic could be actionable as trademark infringement. 
The Ninth Circuit then considered the defendants’ fair 
use arguments. Unlike the district court, the Ninth Circuit did 
not seem concerned about a risk that Playboy would 
monopolize search terms or impinge on the First Amendment 
rights of search engine companies or users. The Ninth Circuit 
  
 270 Id. at 1027 n.32. 
 271 Id. at 1027. 
 272 Id. at 1024. 
 273 Id. at 1028. 
 274 The court also concluded there was a likelihood of trademark dilution 
under the FTDA. Id. at 1031-34. The law regarding the dilution claim was somewhat 
confusing due to the instability of dilution law at that time. The Ninth Circuit found 
that the district court had “erred under the traditional theories of dilution,” but also 
vacated the district court’s opinion in light of the new standard set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003), and re-
opened discovery under the new standard. Id. at 1033-34. As explained above, the 
TDRA has now reversed Moseley to set forth a more lenient standard. See supra Part 
II.B.2.a.  
 275 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 1025. 
 276 Id. at 1026. 
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explained that the case was not analogous to Welles because 
the defendant had reasonable alternatives to using the 
trademark term—the defendants was already using over 400 
other terms to advertise adult-oriented businesses.277 
The stability of the Ninth Circuit’s Netscape opinion, 
however, was undermined by a skeptical concurrence. Judge 
Berzon supported the court’s opinion as “fully consistent with 
the applicable precedents” and was also struck by the 
analytical similarity of Netscape and Brookfield.278 However, 
Judge Berzon warned that the Brookfield holding reached to 
“situations in which a party is never confused.”279 Judge Berzon 
saw a “big difference between hijacking a customer to another 
website by making the customer think he or she is visiting the 
trademark holder’s website (even if only briefly) . . . and just 
distracting a potential customer with another choice . . . .”280  
Judge Berzon analogized the search engine’s results 
listings to market shelves.281 A customer coming to a market 
searching for one trademark owner’s product (for example, 
Calvin Klein) might be distracted en route to that purchase by 
another product (for example, Charter Club).282 Judge Berzon 
noted, however, that this was essentially analogous to the 
Brookfield case, given that those searching for “moviebuff” 
would not have been confused about the sponsorship of the 
West Coast Video website.283 While Judge Berzon was 
comfortable applying the Brookfield rule to unlabeled (and 
therefore potentially confusing) advertisements, she believed 
that the general rule of Brookfield was “insupportable.”284 
3. Pop-Ups and Trademark Use 
The Ninth Circuit opinion in Playboy v. Netscape thus 
left the law of search engine results in substantial flux. 
Brookfield and initial interest confusion remained the leading 
precedent on meta tags and SEO practices. Google’s advertis-
ing practices in the right column and similar models employed 
  
 277 Id. at 1030 (“There is nothing indispensable, in this context, about [the 
plaintiff’s] marks.”). 
 278  Netscape II, 354 F.3d at 1034 (Berzon, J., concurring). 
 279 Id.  
 280 Id. at 1035 (emphasis in original). 
 281  Id. 
 282 Id. (using these two product lines as an example). 
 283  Id.  
 284 Id. at 1036. 
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by others were arguably governed by the ruling in Netscape, 
but Judge Berzon had also stated that Brookfield was 
“insupportable.”285 Since Netscape, there has been much 
litigation and little progress in the law. The most important 
legal development has been the adoption, prefigured by the 
Netscape district court decision, of claims that the commercial 
sale of search terms does not amount to trademark use. That 
view proceeds largely from a Second Circuit ruling concerning 
pop-up advertisements.286  
The most important pop-up cases have concerned a 
single company, WhenU, the creator and distributor of a 
program called “SaveNow.”287 The SaveNow software comes 
bundled with certain programs made available for free 
download. In the process of installing the free software, users 
may install SaveNow, either intentionally or inadvertently. 
Because those installing free software often do not scroll 
through their installation agreements, they are often unaware 
that they have agreed to install such programs.288 
When installed, SaveNow displays advertisements that 
appear over top of normal browser windows. To maximize  
the relevancy of the advertisements (and thereby its own 
revenues), the SaveNow advertisements, like the banner 
advertisements in Playboy v. Netscape, are keyed to specific 
terms.289 Unlike the Netscape banner ads, however, and more 
like Google’s AdSense, SaveNow’s advertisements are triggered 
when the terms are presented in other places, such as the 
domain name of a website or the text of website contents.290 
SaveNow’s pop-up advertisements also appear in new browser 
  
 285  Since the ruling, district courts in the Ninth Circuit have generally 
understood themselves to be bound by Brookfield. See, e.g., Storus v. Aroa Marketing, 
No. C-06-2454 MMC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11698, at *13-16 (N.D. Cal. Feb 15, 2008).  
 286 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 409-12 (2d Cir. 
2005). 
 287 WhenU describes how SaveNow works on its website. See WhenU/ 
SaveNow Help, http://www.whenu.com/faq_savenow.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2007). 
 288 Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 739 (E.D. 
Mich. 2003) (“Although many users claim not to be aware that SaveNow has been 
loaded on to their computer, the Court finds that some user assent is required before 
SaveNow is downloaded. The fact that assent may be in the form of a reflexive 
agreement required for some other bundled program does not negate the fact that the 
computer user must affirmatively ask for or agree to the download.”). 
 289 See WhenU, Advertisers, http://app.whenu.com/AdReports (last visited 
Feb. 29, 2008) (“[R]elevance works: Our consumers respond to our advertisements 10 to 
20 times more often than typical graphical advertisements.”). 
 290 See id. (“Our precision targeting technology examines keywords, URLs, 
HTML code, and search terms currently in use on the consumer’s browser to select 
relevant advertisements.”). 
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windows, arguably reducing the likelihood that users may 
believe them to be sponsored by or affiliated with content 
presented in the main window. 
In 2003, SaveNow became a magnet for trademark 
litigation. Three federal district court opinions were issued 
concerning the company’s practices. U-Haul International v. 
WhenU.com, from a Virginia district court, concerned 
SaveNow’s use of the key term “u-haul.”291 The Virginia district 
court found in favor of the defendant.292 It stated that 
SaveNow’s pop-up windows did not display the plaintiff’s  
“U-Haul” trademark and that the SaveNow program itself did 
not otherwise make the trademark visible to users.293 According 
to the court, “U-Haul fails to adduce any evidence that WhenU 
uses U-Haul’s trademarks to identify the source of its goods or 
services.”294 Given the absence of trademark use, the court 
concluded that WhenU was not liable.295 
In a similar case in Michigan, the Wells Fargo Company 
sued over SaveNow’s use of the terms “wells fargo” and 
“quicken loans” to trigger advertisements.296 The district court, 
citing approvingly to the district court decision in Playboy v. 
Netscape, found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a 
trademark use of the plaintiff’s trademarks.297 Additionally, 
and also echoing the district court in Playboy v. Netscape, the 
court explained that as a matter of trademark policy, it was 
important to understand that “trademark laws are concerned 
with source identification” and do not extend to rights beyond 
that purpose.298 According to the Michigan district court, 
SaveNow’s pop-up advertisements were not a use of the marks 
and instead constituted a legitimate form of “comparative 
advertising.”299  
However, a federal district court in New York reached 
the opposite conclusion in a case brought by the 1-800 Contacts 
  
 291 U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 727 (E.D. Va. 
2003). 
 292 Id. at 731. 
 293  Id. at 730. 
 294 Id. at 728. 
 295  Id. at 731. 
 296 Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 737 (E.D. 
Mich. 2003). 
 297  Id. at 763-64. 
 298 Id. at 761. 
 299 Id. at 761-62. 
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company.300 The plaintiff sued over SaveNow’s use of the term 
and the court, essentially applying the Brookfield initial 
interest confusion doctrine, found that SaveNow had used and 
infringed upon the plaintiff’s trademark.301 The Second Circuit 
reversed, however, and brought the outcome of the 1-800 case 
into line with Wells Fargo and U-Haul.302 The Second Circuit 
found that SaveNow had not made trademark use of the 
plaintiff’s 1-800 Contacts marks on goods or services.303 The use 
of “1-800 Contacts” was only in the non-visible software code, 
and the Second Circuit stated that “internal utilization of a 
trademark in a way that does not communicate it to the public 
is analogous to a[n] individual’s private thoughts about a 
trademark. Such conduct simply does not violate the Lanham 
Act.”304 
4. Applying Use to Search Engines 
The law of search engine results today is often pulled by 
the gravitation of two very powerful doctrines: the Scylla of 
initial interest confusion and the Charybdis of trademark use. 
The district courts of the Second Circuit, following the 
reasoning of the 1-800 Contacts opinion and the district court 
in Netscape, have found that search term sales are not 
infringing because they are not a trademark use. Outside the 
Second Circuit, many courts seem inclined toward the 
reasoning of Brookfield and the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in 
Netscape.  
Part III, infra, will explain why neither approach is 
desirable. However, in order to describe the current land- 
scape, it is useful to first set forth a representative (non-
exhaustive) list of district court opinions that consider the issue 
of trademark use. These are broken down into two categories: 
(1) opinions from the district courts of the Second Circuit 
applying the trademark use doctrine and (2) opinions from 
outside the Second Circuit that have rejected the doctrine.305  
  
 300 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 488-505 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003), rev’d, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 301  Id. at 489-92, 504-05. 
 302 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 413. 
 303  Id. at 409. 
 304 Id.  
 305  For a summary of recent use cases, see Vulcan Golf L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 
No. 07-C-3371, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22155, at *29-32 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2008) 
(addressing claims about domain names). 
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a. Opinions Applying Trademark Use 
1. In the Southern District of New York case of Merck & 
Co. v. MediPlan Health Consulting, the plaintiff sued the 
defendant for purchasing search engine placement under the 
term “zocor,” which corresponded with a registered trademark 
for a pharmaceutical.306 The court granted the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss these claims, finding that purchasing 
advertising placement under keywords did not amount to “use 
in commerce,” and that the Second Circuit’s decision in 1-800 
Contacts controlled.307 It stated that keyword purchases, like 
the terms used by SaveNow, are “internal utilization of a 
trademark in a way that does not communicate it to the 
public.”308 The same court later denied a motion for reconsid-
eration in light of developments in the case law from other 
circuits.309  
2. Google’s greatest district court victory to date under a 
use theory was the Northern District of New York case of 
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google.310 In that case, the computer repair 
company Rescuecom sued Google for allowing its competitors to 
purchase AdWords placement under the “rescuecom” search 
term. Relying on 1-800 Contacts, Google filed a motion to 
dismiss the case. The New York district court granted the 
motion, finding that Google’s sale of the term “rescuecom” was 
not visible to the public. Applying 1-800 Contacts, the court 
concluded there was no trademark use and therefore no 
liability for trademark infringement or dilution.311 The plaintiff 
appealed and the Rescuecom case is currently before the 
Second Circuit.312 Google is clearly hoping to secure a post-
Netscape circuit court opinion that will validate its AdWords 
business model. 
  
 306 Merck & Co. v. MediPlan Health Consulting Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 406 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also 431 F. Supp. 2d 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The plaintiff also 
objected to the defendant’s use of the term “generic zocor” in the text of its own website. 
These claims were not dismissed by the district court. Merck & Co., 425 F. Supp. 2d at 
413. 
 307 Merck & Co., 425 F. Supp. 2d at 415. 
 308 Id. 
 309 431 F. Supp. 2d 425, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 310 See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 397-404 
(N.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 311  Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 403-04 (citing 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. 
WhenU.com, 414 F.3d 400, 406-07 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 312  Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., No. 06-4881-CV (2d Cir. filed Nov. 7, 
2006). 
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3. In FragranceNet.com v. FragranceX.com, a case 
decided recently in the Eastern District of New York, the 
plaintiff sought leave to amend its complaint to allege that the 
defendant had infringed its trademarks via AdWords pur-
chases.313 The defendant argued that the keywords were not a 
trademark use.314 The district court agreed with the defendant 
and denied the motion for leave to amend.315 The opinion was 
also notable in that it denied the application of use to a meta 
tag claim as well, finding the Second Circuit’s 1-800 Contacts 
opinion in “stark contrast” to the Ninth Circuit decisions in 
Brookfield and Netscape.316 
4. In S&L Vitamins v. Australian Gold, the plaintiff 
brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that its 
use of terms corresponding to the defendant’s trademarks in 
meta tags and purchased search engine keywords did not 
constitute infringement.317 The court, citing prior Second 
Circuit decisions, determined that the plaintiff had not used 
the defendant’s marks “by purchasing keywords and sponsored 
links.”318 
b. Opinions Rejecting Trademark Use 
1. The first major trademark case against Google was 
brought in the Eastern District of Virginia by the insurance 
company GEICO and entailed the rejection of a trademark use 
argument by Google.319 GEICO alleged Google infringed its 
trademarks by selling advertising linked to the “geico” term 
(and other terms).320 GEICO relied heavily on the (subsequently 
reversed) district court decision in 1-800 Contacts as well as on 
meta tag case law, and Google relied on a trademark use 
defense.321 In its 2004 opinion, the district court denied the 
motion to dismiss, finding the sale of keywords was sufficient 
  
 313 FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. FragranceX.com, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 545, 546 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 314  Id. at 547. 
 315  Id. at 555. 
 316 Id. at 554-55. 
 317 S&L Vitamins v. Australian Gold, 521 F. Supp. 2d 188, 201-02 (E.D.N.Y. 
2007). 
 318 Id. at 202. 
 319 See Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. 
Va. 2004). 
 320 Id. at 702. 
 321 Id. at 703. 
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trademark use to state a claim for infringement.322 The court 
found Google’s sales of specific terms to be distinguishable from 
WhenU’s sales of “broad categories” of terms in its SaveNow 
program.323 The defendants had “marketed the protected marks 
themselves as keywords to which advertisers could directly 
purchase rights.”324 However, after a bench trial, the court 
granted judgment to the defendants on the issue of infringe-
ment, finding that GEICO failed to demonstrate a likelihood of 
consumer confusion.325 
2. In the 2006 Georgia district court case of Rescuecom 
Corp. v. Computer Troubleshooters, the defendant, Computer 
Troubleshooters, had purchased a Google AdWords placement 
under the term “rescuecom.”326 Computer Troubleshooters 
claimed that purchasing a Google AdWord did not amount to 
infringing trademark use under the Lanham Act.327 Following 
the reasoning of GEICO, the court denied defendant’s motion  
to dismiss, finding that the issues of trademark use and con-
fusion were factual questions that could not be resolved on a 
preliminary motion.328  
3. In the 2006 New Jersey district court case of 800-JR 
Cigar v. GoTo.com, the plaintiff sold cigars through its website 
and owned federal trademark rights in the term “JR Cigar” 
(and other terms).329 It brought suit against GoTo.com for the 
sale of advertisements keyed to terms such as “jr cigar.”330 
GoTo.com, like Google, defended on the basis that selling 
placement for search terms was not trademark use. Following 
the reasoning of GEICO, the court found that there was 
sufficient trademark use. Applying theories of initial interest 
confusion pursuant to Brookfield and trademark dilution, the 
court denied summary judgment.331 
  
 322 Id. at 704-05. 
 323 Id. at 704. 
 324 Id. 
 325 Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04cv507, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 18642, at *25-26, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005). 
 326 Rescuecom Corp. v. Computer Troubleshooters USA, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 
1263, 1264 (N.D. Ga. 2005). In this case, Rescuecom did not sue Google, but only 
brought suit against the company that had purchased the AdWords placement. Id. 
 327 Id. 
 328 Id. at 1266-67. 
 329 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273 (D.N.J. 2006). 
 330 Id. at 278-79. 
 331 Id. at 290-96. 
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4. Buying for the Home v. Humble Abode332 was decided 
by another New Jersey district court in 2006. The plaintiff and 
defendant were competitors in the online sale of furniture. The 
defendant had purchased Google AdWords for the term “total 
bedroom,” which corresponded with the plaintiff’s trademark.333 
The defendant moved for summary judgment based on an 
absence of trademark use.334 Surveying the varied case law on 
the issue, the New Jersey district court found the allegations 
“clearly satisf[ied] the Lanham Act’s ‘use’ requirement.”335 The 
court noted that the keyword purchases were “a commercial 
transaction . . . trading on the value of Plaintiff’s mark.”336 The 
court stated that “the mark was used to provide a computer 
user with direct access (that is, a link) to Defendants’ website 
through which the user could make furniture purchases.”337 
5. In the 2006 District of Minnesota case of Edina 
Realty v. TheMLSOnline,338 the plaintiff, a realtor, alleged that 
the defendant had infringed on it trademarks by purchasing 
them as advertising keywords from Google and Yahoo.339 The 
defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 
keyword purchases did not amount to trademark use. Citing 
Brookfield, the court stated, “Based on the plain meaning of the 
Lanham Act, the purchase of search terms is a use in com-
merce.”340 The court allowed the plaintiff’s infringement claims 
to proceed to trial.341 
6. In the 2007 Pennsylvania district court case of J.G. 
Wentworth v. Settlement Funding,342 the plaintiff claimed that 
the defendant had infringed on its trademarks by purchasing 
corresponding terms in Google’s AdWords program. In response 
  
 332 Buying for the Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d 310 
(D.N.J. 2006). 
 333 Id. at 315-17. 
 334 Id. at 318-20; see 800-JR Cigar, Inc. 437 F. Supp. 2d at 277. 
 335 Humble Abode, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23. 
 336 Id. at 323. 
 337 Id. 
 338 Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSOnline.com, No. 04-4371, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13775 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006). 
 339 See id. at *3 (“Over the past four years, defendant has purchased the 
following search terms from Google: Edina Realty, Edina Reality, EdinaReality.com, 
EdinaRealty, EdinaRealty.com, www.EdinaReality.com and www.EdinaRealty.com.”). 
 340 Id. at *10. 
 341 Id. at *21. The plaintiff’s trademark dilution claims were dismissed due to 
a failure to meet the Supreme Court’s stringent “actual dilution” standard announced 
in Moseley. Id. at *22-23. 
 342 J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. v. Settlement Funding LLC, No. 06-0597, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 288 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007). 
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to the trademark use defense, the court rejected the 1-800 
Contacts position, stating that the use was “not analogous to 
‘an individual’s private thoughts’ as defendant suggests. By 
establishing an opportunity to reach consumers via alleged 
purchase and/or use of a protected trademark, defendant has 
crossed the line from internal use to use in commerce under the 
Lanham Act.”343 At the same time, however, the court granted 
the defendant’s motion to dismiss, also rejecting the reasoning 
of Brookfield and finding that the plaintiff had not introduced 
evidence that could support a finding of a likelihood of 
confusion.344 
7. Just recently, Google settled its claims in Google v. 
American Blind & Wallpaper Factory,345 a long-running case 
brought by Google in the Ninth Circuit.346 Google had brought 
suit seeking a declaratory judgment that it did not infringe the 
defendant’s marks through the sale of AdWords advertise-
ments for terms corresponding with the plaintiff’s trademarks 
(for example, “american blinds”). In a 2007 ruling, the Califor-
nia district court found that Playboy v. Netscape made “an 
implicit finding of trademark use in commerce” that would 
apply to the Google AdWords program.347 The district court also 
stated that “Brookfield, like Playboy, suggests that the Ninth 
Circuit would assume use in commerce here.”348 The court was 
therefore prepared to allow the case to proceed to trial.349 
The above cases highlight the struggle to reconcile 
jurisprudence over initial interest confusion, originating in 
Brookfield, with contemporary litigation over search engine 
  
 343 Id. at *17. 
 344 Id. at *23-24 (“Due to the separate and distinct nature of the links created 
on any of the search results pages in question, potential consumers have no 
opportunity to confuse defendant’s services, goods, advertisements, links or websites 
for those of plaintiff.”). 
 345 The extensive motion practice can be found at Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & 
Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-5340, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32450 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 
2008); 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32450 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007); 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 
67284 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2006); 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58970 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2006); 
74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 2005 US Dist. LEXIS 6228 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005); 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27601 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2004). 
 346 Google Settles Trademark Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2007, at C4. 
 347 Am. Blind & Wallpaper, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32450, at *18. 
 348 Id. at *20-21. 
 349 Id. at *21. The ruling was not an unqualified win for the defendant, 
however. The court dismissed its dilution claims and granted summary judgment to 
Google on claims based on the “American Blind” or “American Blinds,” which the court 
found could not be protected as trademarks. Id. at *26, 26 n.16, 39-40. However, the 
defendant had also alleged infringement of three other marks: “American Blind 
Factory,” “Decoratetoday,” and “American Blind & Wallpaper Factory.” Id. at *26 n.16. 
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results. While the doctrine of trademark use has been utilized 
in the district courts of the Second Circuit to keep trademark 
law out of search results, the majority of district courts outside 
the Second Circuit have been unwilling to adopt such a  
bright-line test. Caught between initial interest confusion and 
trademark use, the doctrine pertaining to search engine results 
is in flux and will likely continue to be unstable in the near 
future. 
This brings us to the question of how courts should 
approach the intersection of trademark law and Google’s search 
results. 
III. THE PUBLIC INDEXICAL INTEREST 
In Part II, the legal precedents regarding the regulation 
of search results were described. As was explained, there seems 
little possibility that the law will soon be capable of supervising 
generally the unique manner in which Google acts as an index 
and advertiser. However, within the limited confines of trade-
mark law, some courts have seemed willing to curtail abusive 
SEO practices that influence Google’s left column (under the 
rubric of competitor meta tag suits) and some have been willing 
to consider supervising Google’s practices in its right-hand 
column. 
This Part will argue that trademark law should stay 
engaged with the commercialization of search engine results in 
both columns. However, both initial interest confusion and 
trademark use are flawed theories that promise little progress 
for the public interest in search results. Trademark law should 
ideally pursue the goal of protecting the value of search engines 
as useful indices. However, protecting search engines as indices 
is a complex goal. The social value of online indices can be 
threatened by SEO practices, by the commercial practices of 
search engines, and by trademark law itself. What is needed in 
this arena is a doctrine that keeps the role of trademark law in 
search results very limited, but does not abdicate the state’s 
role entirely. 
A. Avoiding the Scylla and Charybdis 
District courts confronting claims of keyword purchases 
today must navigate a dangerous path between two powerful 
doctrines, initial interest confusion and trademark use. Neither 
of these recent doctrines is consistent with trademark law’s 
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historic logic. Nor is either very helpful in ensuring the public 
utility of online indices. 
1. Initial Interest Confusion 
The problems with the doctrine of initial interest 
confusion as applied to the Internet have been explored 
extensively by both courts and commentators.350 The principal 
concern among courts and commentators is that that the 
application of the doctrine to search results offers no clear 
consumer benefits and risks substantial consumer harms.351 As 
the district court in Netscape noted, it is not clear that a user 
searching for a given word on a search engine is actually 
searching for the trademark meaning of that word.352 Thus, 
initial interest confusion may make search engines less useful 
by increasing consumer search costs.353 Initial interest 
confusion threatens to allow trademark owners to monopolize 
language, as the Netscape district court put it.354 Search engine 
users searching for non-trademark usages of words like “cars” 
or “nike” may have their interest in finding information on 
generic terms eclipsed by a proliferation of trademark-related 
results.355 
Even in cases where a search engine user is searching 
for a trademark holder’s product by using the search term as a 
proxy, as the Netscape district court also noted, it may not be 
clear which market context corresponds with the user’s 
intent.356 And even if the user is searching for the exact good or 
service provided by a single trademark holder, as Judge 
Berzon’s concurrence in the Ninth Circuit opinion points out, 
this consumer might be pleased to be presented with additional 
choices.357 
  
 350 My earlier arguments against the application of the doctrine to search 
engines can be found in Lastowka, supra note 7, at 854-58, 877. The writing in this 
area is quite prolific. A recent article by Professor Jennifer Rothman offers a 
comprehensive general attack on the doctrine. Rothman, supra note 208. 
 351 Rothman, supra note 208, at 121-22. 
 352 Netscape I, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1073 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
 353 See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer 
Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 810 (2004). 
 354 Netscape I, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1083. 
 355  Of course, as shown in Part I. C, supra, even in the absence of trademark 
law’s influence, this result may obtain. 
 356 Netscape I, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1083. 
 357 Netscape II, 354 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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There may be some arguable consumer-protection logic 
behind initial interest confusion. Ideally, in offline contexts, the 
initial interest confusion doctrine might be defended on the 
basis that business competitors should not be able to use 
trademarks in a way that amounts to a bait-and-switch 
tactic.358 For instance, a store should not be able to advertise 
that it offers Brand A, generating initial interest by consumers 
and resultant traffic to its store, and then offer those who 
arrive to the store only Brand B. This is essentially the story of 
the billboard in Brookfield. If an actual billboard were to divert 
consumers in this way by using the drawing power of a 
trademark, there would be good reason for trademark law to 
prevent that type of conduct. The plaintiff’s trademark would 
be used as a false lure to bring consumers into unfruitful 
expenditures of time and energy.359  
But while consumers may see some benefits from 
limited applications of the bait-and-switch theory of initial 
interest confusion, as the Dr. Seuss case demonstrates, there 
are reasons to be concerned that this expansion of trademark 
law may have the negative consequence of restricting the 
permissible scope of free expression.360 Any broadening of 
trademark law rights past traditional boundaries should be 
scrutinized carefully for a potential impact on free speech 
rights and other public interests.361 
The more important point with regard to bait-and-
switch theory, however, is that it has not been guiding the 
application of initial interest confusion to search results. At 
present, initial interest confusion as applied to search results is 
much closer to a dilution-type right of word ownership. As 
Judge Berzon noted in Netscape, despite the fact that 
Brookfield was premised on initial interest confusion, there 
was no evidence that consumers were ever confused in that 
case.362 Applied to search results, it seems initial interest 
  
 358 See Hannibal Travis, The Battle for Mindshare: The Emerging Consensus 
That the First Amendment Protects Corporate Criticism and Parody on the Internet, 10 
VA. J.L. & TECH. 3 at 85 (2005); Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 
(7th Cir. 1996). 
 359 See Rothman, supra note 208, at 161, 161 n.241 (providing citations to 
initial interest confusion cases depending on the logic of “luring”). 
 360 See supra notes 210-213 and accompanying text. See generally Graeme W. 
Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 884 (2004) 
(explaining how initial interest confusion doctrine, by broadening trademark rights, 
increases the level of conflict between trademark and the First Amendment). 
 361 Austin, supra note 360, at 883-84; Lemley, supra note 169, at 1710. 
 362 Netscape II, 354 F.3d at 1035. 
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confusion serves the ends that the district court in Netscape 
feared: the ability to control the general use of words, regard-
less of the public interest. 
In the abstract, it may seem that when a trademark 
owner’s business efforts makes a novel term, such as “ipod” or 
“häagen-dazs,” popular with consumers, the trademark owner 
should possess a legal right to receive the profit (and Web 
traffic) associated with the popularity of that term. Why should 
competitors or Google have the power to profit from the value 
associated with these terms, given that neither competitors nor 
Google generated the consumer interest in the term? This 
sentiment certainly plays a powerful role in rhetorical justifi-
cations of dilution law, which argue against any free riding. 
But as Mark Lemley has recently explained, there is no general 
anti-free-riding principle in intellectual property law.363 To the 
contrary, intellectual property often creates spillovers where 
the benefits of investments are not internalized by those 
granted ownership of the associated rights.364 Intellectual 
property owners have not captured, and should not capture, all 
economic value attributable to their activities. Requiring that 
would lead to significant social harms. 
This is nowhere clearer than in the case of initial 
interest confusion as applied to search results listing. An overly 
expansive reading of trademark rights, such as the rule in 
Brookfield, would allow trademark holders to monopolize all 
traffic related to terms associated with their trademarks. Given 
that almost any word can be a trademark, a law to this effect 
would substantially destroy the benefits provided by search 
engines. The popular wealth generated by useful online indices 
would be transformed into the poverty of a pedestrian 
trademark directory.365 
Is this possible with respect to Google’s results? While 
we might imagine courts would find a way to avoid impeding 
search, there is cause for concern. In some jurisdictions, initial 
interest confusion is becoming a controlling doctrine in search 
engine jurisprudence. For instance, in the recent case of Storus 
  
 363 Lemley, supra note 101, at 1032 (“[T]he rhetoric of free riding in 
intellectual property . . . [is] fundamentally misguided.”). 
 364 Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
257, 258-61 (2007). 
 365 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 353, at 816 (“Brookfield takes the initial 
interest confusion rationale in a novel and dangerous direction that disregards its 
confusion-based origins, defies core trademark doctrine, and thwarts the normative 
goals of trademark law.”). 
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v. Aroa Marketing, a district court in the Ninth Circuit 
awarded summary judgment to a plaintiff complaining of a 
competitor’s purchase of a Google AdWords advertisement.366 
Applying the Brookfield doctrine and distinguishing Netscape’s 
application of that doctrine to search engines, the court found 
that the mere diversion of traffic to the defendant’s website 
was sufficient to establish infringement in the search context.367 
2. Trademark Use 
Given the potential dangers to the public interest posed 
by an unchecked initial interest confusion doctrine, it may 
seem prudent to keep trademark law entirely out of the process 
of regulating search engines. The thought might be that unless 
some categorical immunity is provided for search engines, 
trademark law—and the initial interest confusion doctrine  
in particular—will ruin the shape of search engine results. 
Professor Eric Goldman is a leading advocate of this view. He 
has claimed that “trademark law must step aside” from the 
regulation of search results.368 He explains that “the solution is 
simple: Deregulate the keyword in Internet searching.”369 
Unsurprisingly, Professor Goldman has also favored the 
trademark use doctrine as a means of achieving this objective. 
The goal would be to deregulate relevancy entirely. Decisions 
such as Rescuecom and FragranceNet essentially achieve this 
result by finding that the sale of term-keyed AdWords 
advertisement does not amount to trademark use.370 Several 
scholarly commentators agree that the doctrine of trademark 
use is essential to limiting the expansion of errant doctrines.371  
  
 366  Storus Corp. v. Aroa Mktg., No. C-06-2454 MMC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11698, at *11-16 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2008).  
 367  Id. at *10-15, *13 n.6. It is important to note that the plaintiff’s (weak) 
trademark was present in the text of the defendant’s AdWords. Id. at *11-15.  
 368 Goldman, supra note 67, at 510. 
 369 Id. at 596. 
 370 FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. FragranceX.com, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 545, 550 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007); Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 401-02 
(N.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 371 See, e.g., Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of 
“Trademark Use,” 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371, 450-57 (2005); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark 
A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 
1669, 1675-82 (2007) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Grounding]; Dogan & Lemley, 
supra note 353, at 805-11; Uli Widmaier, Use, Liability and the Structure of Trademark 
Law, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 708 (2004). 
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Professor Margreth Barrett, for instance, has lamented 
the demise of trademark use.372 She views the public interest  
as threatened by a “remarkable expansion of the control  
trademark owners are able to extend . . . over unauthorized 
references to their marks on the Internet.”373 Uli Widmaier 
argues that “[t]rademark use must become once again a 
mandatory element of all trademark claims. The courts must 
stop disregarding this foundational premise of trademark 
law.”374 
Professors Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley are the 
leading advocates of use as a limitation on trademark law, and 
particularly on internet trademark law.375 According to Dogan 
and Lemley, “The trademark use requirement serves a gate-
keeper function, limiting the reach of trademark law without 
regard to a factual inquiry into consumer confusion.”376 They 
state, “Selling advertising space based on an Internet keyword 
that is also a trademark does not use that trademark as a 
brand. The Internet intermediary is not selling any product or 
service using those terms as an identifier.”377 
Yet this is exactly the argument that many district 
courts outside the Second Circuit have found unpersuasive, 
and that the Ninth Circuit in the Netscape decision decried as 
“absurd.”378 If Google knowingly sells advertising placement 
under the term “nike” to Adidas in order to direct consumer 
traffic to the website of Adidas, it is hard to understand why 
Google “does not use that trademark as a brand.” Indeed, many 
district courts, and the Ninth Circuit in Netscape, have found 
that such use is clearly within the reach of the Lanham Act.379 
  
 372 Barrett, supra note 371, at 373-75. 
 373 Id. at 375. 
 374 Widmaier, supra note 371, at 708. 
 375 See generally Dogan & Lemley, supra note 353; Dogan & Lemley, 
Grounding, supra note 371. Professor Lemley is involved in courtroom advocacy as 
well. As he acknowledges in his scholarly writing, he has represented Google and 
several other companies in major lawsuits that have expanded the defensive scope of 
trademark use doctrine.  
 376 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 353, at 805. 
 377 Id. at 807. 
 378 354 F.3d 1020, 1027 n.32; see also Misha Gregory Macaw, Google, Inc. v. 
American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc.: A Justification for the Use of Trademarks 
as Keywords to Trigger Paid Advertising Placements in Internet Search Engine Results, 
32 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 48 (2005) (concluding that Google’s AdWords is 
a “use in commerce” and that this “is entirely consistent with the policy underpinnings” 
of trademark law). 
 379 See supra Part II.C. 
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By contrast, the line of reasoning being followed by 
district courts in the Second Circuit, that this type of use is 
“not visible to the public” and that it consists only of the 
“private thought” of Google,380 seems like a concerted effort to 
ignore the reality of the situation. The search term is clearly 
communicated to the user who is, after all, querying Google 
with regard to that term. It is the value of the term “nike” as a 
brand name that makes it valuable to the majority of AdWords 
advertisers. 
It seems quite obvious that the sale of advertising keyed 
to terms that are valuable primarily (or only) due to their 
correspondence with well-known trademarks is a use of those 
trademarks in commerce. Yet it must be emphasized that 
trademark infringement does not occur simply because a party 
uses another party’s trademark. It is only by virtue of the 
doctrine of initial interest confusion that some courts have 
decided this should be the case. But prior to that development, 
it was a foundational concept in trademark law that uses of a 
trademark that created no likelihood of consumer confusion 
were not uses that made a party liable for trademark 
infringement. 
The middle ground between trademark use and initial 
interest confusion doctrine seems like the right place for 
Google’s results to fall, and some courts have started to see 
this. Two of the courts rejecting trademark use have also 
rejected plaintiffs’ claims that search engine results have 
created actionable consumer confusion. The court in GEICO v. 
Google, Inc. reached this result after a bench trial.381 The court 
in J.G. Wentworth v. Settlement Funding reached this result on 
a motion to dismiss, while at the same time managing to 
explicitly reject the doctrine of initial interest confusion.382 This 
is the correct analysis.  
Rejecting all claims based on a search engine’s sale of 
placement under terms would certainly keep claims out of 
court. But it might also encourage Google to adopt sharper 
practices. The public interest would not be served if trademark 
owners could dictate the shape of Google’s results. But if 
  
 380 See supra Part II.C. 
 381 Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 
2004); Gov’t Employees. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04cv507, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18642, at *1-7, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005).  
 382 J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. v. Settlement Funding LLC, No. 06-0597, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 288, at *1, *19-24, 85 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1780 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007). 
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Google were accorded absolutely free reign to index the results 
it offers in response to user queries, it is not hard to imagine 
ways that it could abuse its power to the detriment of both 
trademark owners and the public. 
The leading critics of the expanding trademark use 
doctrine are Professors Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis, 
who have co-authored two articles criticizing arguments by 
Dogan and Lemley.383 Dinwoodie and Janis find little basis in 
the statutory text for the doctrine.384 Dogan and Lemley have 
responded by advocating for a common-law evolution.385 
If trademark use represents a doctrinal evolution, it 
should be defended on policy grounds. Dinwoodie and Janis 
argue, persuasively, that categorically removing the influence 
of trademark law from certain commercial activities is unwise, 
especially if these activities might be found to create consumer 
confusion. Trademark use abdicates the power of trademark 
law to police actions that could be potentially harmful to 
consumers.386 Dinwoodie and Janis explain, “Experience mili-
tates against the pure laissez-faire approach . . . . Were it 
otherwise, of course, one might question whether there was any 
need for trademark and unfair competition law.”387  
This seems quite right. Courts that have carefully 
considered contemporary search results without being caught 
in the Brookfield doctrine have found no likelihood of consumer 
confusion generated. If initial interest confusion can be 
jettisoned, there seems to be little pressing need to confront a 
threat that may never materialize.388 Trademark law is 
currently one of the only means by which law polices Google’s 
  
 383 Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Lessons from the Trademark Use 
Debate, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1703 (2007) [hereinafter Dinwoodie & Janis, Lessons]; 
Dinwoodie & Janis, Contextualism, supra note 70, at 1597. 
 384 Dinwoodie & Janis, Contextualism, supra note 70, at 1608-15; Dinwoodie & 
Janis, Lessons, supra note 383, at 1706-08; see also Sarah J. Givan, Using Trademarks 
as Location Tools on the Internet: Use in Commerce?, 2005 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 4 ¶ 47 
(2005) (concluding keyword uses are a “use in commerce” under the Lanham Act). 
 385 Dogan & Lemley, Grounding, supra note 371, at 1686 (“Contrary to 
Dinwoodie and Janis’s charge, this form of common-law evolution of trademark 
doctrine is neither revolutionary nor unique. Indeed, common law development has 
been at the heart of a wide variety of IP doctrines . . . .”). 
 386 See Dinwoodie & Janis, Lessons, supra note 383, at 1719. 
 387 Id.; see also Pasquale & Bracha, supra note 115, at 4, 32 (critiquing 
arguments that market discipline will correct problems with search results). 
 388 Cf. Grimmelmann, supra note 85, at 62 (“The search engine’s proper 
defense is that it is not misleading users, not that it is not using the trademark. It is 
easy to imagine search engines that deliberately cause serious confusion.”). 
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search results. This makes the trademark use doctrine essen-
tially a bid for Google’s Law.  
If the Scylla of initial interest confusion and the 
Charybdis of trademark use can be avoided, how might we 
reconcile trademark law with search engine results? This is 
considered in the next two sections. 
B. Space Versus Index: Supermarkets and Libraries 
In setting trademark policy for search engines, it is 
important to see how Google is like and unlike past spaces.389 
Courts and commentators discussing search engines often use 
spatial analogies in justifying decisions and policies, be they 
the highways and signposts of Brookfield or the store shelves 
that Judge Berzon referenced in Netscape.390 But Google is not 
simply an online version of a store shelf.391  
Judge Berzon’s concurrence in Netscape suggests that 
consumers desire a broad range of choices and it is good to have 
multiple purchasing options present on stores shelves. Yet 
store owners do not stock both Coke and Pepsi in order to 
further the public interest in choice.392  
Supermarkets, like all other businesses, seek to make a 
profit. If a supermarket shopper were to request Coke 
specifically, the store owner will offer Pepsi as an alternative 
only if this might lead to increased revenues. Generally, if the 
  
 389 Givan, supra note 384, at 4 ¶ 5 (“Consumers navigate the internet through 
the use of words. . . . In effect, words are location in the online domain.”). 
 390 I have used spatial analogies this way myself, explaining that search 
engines might be used to “recreate some of the spatial realities of the marketplace” by 
placing “goods in spatial proximity” and “providing consumers with more choices.” 
Lastowka, supra note 7, at 877.  
 391 As Dinwoodie and Janis explain:  
[T]he all-too-ready resort to offline analogies to justify outcomes in Internet 
trademark cases gives us pause. Courts should not automatically assume 
that proximity in the online environment and proximity in the offline 
environment have the same effects. The context is different, and there are 
great risks in taking analogies too seriously. 
Dinwoodie & Janis, Lessons, supra note 383, at 1721; see also Givan, supra note 384, 
¶ 5 (“In this physical world, Safeway does not use Kellogg’s trademarks to sell Safeway 
products.”). 
 392 Many venues today have exclusive arrangements that lead them to stock 
only Coke or Pepsi. See, e.g., Michele Simon, Can Food Companies Be Trusted to Self-
Regulate? An Analysis of Corporate Lobbying and Deception to Undermine Children’s 
Health, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 169, 173 (2006) (“With public schools so desperate for 
funding, over the past two decades many districts have opened their doors to major 
beverage companies such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola, often forming exclusive 
contracts also known as ‘pouring rights.’”). 
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profit margins are equal for both beverages and both are on 
hand, a request for Coke will not be met with the counteroffer 
of Pepsi.393 Stores may offer their customers a choice by 
stocking multiple brands clustered by product type, but they 
may not. The choices available in any marketplace are a 
byproduct of economic incentives, social customs, and the 
logistics of spatial coordination.  
In theory, Google can offer better choices to consumers 
since it faces no spatial limit on the number of products it 
offers (which, in fact, are free hyperlinks). Yet Google is still 
constrained by the size of a monitor display and the patience of 
users. Most importantly, Google profits not by selling products 
to consumers, but by delivering consumer attention to adver-
tisers.  
Google operates in an indexical environment that is 
importantly different from the spatial context of trademarks. 
Trademarks within real space are often situated in contexts 
that lend meaning to terms.394 Real spaces are fluid and 
smooth, whereas the spaces of Google’s index are rigid and 
striated. In real space, a supermarket aisle smoothly blends to 
a checkout counter to a parking lot to a city street. On Google, 
information does not spill across digital boundaries unless it is 
programmed to do so. Consumers in Google’s “space” of search 
results are largely blind, not just to adjacent products, but to 
many other important contextual clues. They cannot see, for 
instance, the traffic patterns of other consumers, the appear-
ance of a shopkeeper, or the need for a cleanup on aisle five. 
Allowing Google to sell search terms that correspond to 
trademarks will certainly affect the user experience, but it will 
not magically transform Google into a corner drug store.  
There is no way to turn back the clock and restore the 
marketplace to the “natural” pre-Internet order that is thought 
to exist on supermarket shelves. Instead, trademark law in the 
twenty-first century must take into account the rise of 
indexical spaces.395 So far, that transformation has been 
characterized by significant missteps, among them cases like 
Brookfield and 1-800 Contacts. However, it would be premature 
  
 393 Dinwoodie & Janis, Contextualism, supra note 70, at 1630-32 (explaining 
how offering more choices does not necessarily decrease consumer search costs). 
 394 See supra Part II.B. 
 395  As one example of this type of re-imagining law, James Grimmelmann has 
recently published a very thoughtful essay on how information superabundance relates 
to ideal search engine policy approaches. James Grimmelmann, Information Policy for 
the Library of Babel, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 29 (2008). 
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to claim that trademark law has no ability to transform in 
ways that facilitate the public interest in the organization of 
indexical space.  
At its heart, Google is not a space, but a massive index 
of the World Wide Web.396 Some courts have compared meta 
tags to card catalogs.397 This library-based analogy might work 
for Google as well.398 (Indeed, Google currently indexes and 
retrieves the information in books.399) Physical books in almost 
all public libraries today are spatially organized in accordance 
with the Dewey Decimal System, the hierarchical system 
created by Melvil Dewey in 1876.400 Physical tomes are spatially 
ordered in accordance with ten broad categories, and further 
grouped spatially by ten subcategories.401  
By contrast, Google’s index is dynamically created by its 
algorithms in response to user queries. Its content is much 
greater than that of a typical library, but it is also limited to 
certain Web sites. The Google index actually excludes a vast 
amount of data.402 And this has implications in itself—different 
parties have different interests with regard to how thoroughly 
Google performs its indexical inclusion and exclusion.403 
  
 396 The term “index,” like many terms, has a variety of meanings in different 
contexts. I am using it here to refer to “[s]omething that serves to guide, point out, or 
otherwise facilitate reference.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 891 (4th ed. 2000). 
 397 Paccar Inc. v. Telescan Techs., 319 F.3d 243, 248 n.2 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(“Metatags have been ‘analogized to the subject index of a card catalog indicating the 
general subject of a book.’”) (quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 168, § 25:69 (4th ed.)); 
Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1104 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (“Much like the 
subject index of a card catalog, the meta tags give the websurfer using a search engine 
a clearer indication of the content of the website.”). Cf. Shea ex rel. Am. Reporter v. 
Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“With access to the web of computer 
networks known as the Internet . . . a researcher can peruse the card catalogs of 
libraries across the globe . . . .”). 
 398  See generally Grimmelmann, supra note 395 (analogizing search engines to 
a story by Jorge Luis Borges about an infinite library).  
 399 Jeffrey Toobin, Google’s Moon Shot: The Quest for the Universal Library, 
NEW YORKER, Feb. 5, 2007, at 30 (describing the Google Book Search project). 
 400 Sarah N. Lynch & Eugene Mulero, Dewey? At This Library with a Very 
Different Outlook, They Don’t, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2007, at A7 (describing how a 
library in Arizona “is one of the first in the nation to have abandoned the Dewey 
Decimal System of classifying books”). 
 401 See generally Wikipedia, Dewey Decimal Classification, http://en.wikipedia 
.org/wiki/Dewey_Decimal_Classification (last visited Apr. 18, 2008) (explaining the 
basics of the system). 
 402 See generally Wikipedia, Deep Web, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_Web 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2008) (summarizing and collecting current information about 
information not “visible” to search engines). 
 403 See generally Grimmelmann, supra note 85 (mapping out the competing 
interests). Professor Grimmelmann’s article provides a helpful model of the general 
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Insofar as Google’s index involves a process of judgment, 
it is not remarkably different than prior indices. A good index, 
online or offline, will reflect some judgment about the relative 
importance of the information it references. For this reason, 
indices are generally subject to copyright protection.404 Google 
expresses judgments by virtue of its algorithm and its hand-
alteration of some results, such as the results at issue in 
KinderStart. This led the courts in KinderStart and Search 
King to conclude that Google’s relevancy algorithms constituted 
an opinion.405 
Yet the opinion of Google is tied up with its interest  
in making a profit. The Dewey Decimal System was not 
structured as a means of obtaining advertising dollars. 
Originally, the Google founders envisioned an index that would 
be similarly “transparent and in the academic realm.”406 Today, 
however, the structure of Google’s index is secret and the 
company is fully in the commercial realm.  
But this is also not entirely new. Advertising-funded 
offline indices have existed before and continue to exist today. 
Analogies might be drawn to buying guides for cars or 
apartments, which are often made available for free and are 
subsidized by advertising payments for inclusion. GoTo.com 
was originally described, by its founder, as an online version of 
the Yellow Pages.407 Google has since defended AdWords in 
litigation before the Second Circuit using exactly the same 
analogy.408  
  
process of search engine technology keyed to the various legal issues search engines 
raise. 
 404 The author of a good index must understand the nature of the text, 
anticipate what subjects the reader may need to locate, and present an index that is 
useful and concise. Hand-created indices are therefore creative works subject to 
copyright protection. See Laura Gasaway, Do Indexes Qualify for Copyright Protection?, 
8:12 INFO. OUTLOOK 40-41 (2004).  
 405 See supra Part II.A. 
 406 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 407 BATTELLE, supra note 40, at 112. 
 408 Google’s brief in a recent case states: 
There is a directory service that does something far closer to what Google 
does—provides a list of results for a particular area of interest (say, taxicabs), 
and sells advertising space to one company directly across from the listing for 
a competing company. That directory service is the Yellow Pages, and no one 
(except perhaps Rescuecom) would claim that companies advertising in the 
Yellow Pages, much less the Yellow Pages itself, are engaged in unlawful 
trademark use. 
Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 16 n.5, Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, No. 06-4881-cv (2d 
Cir., filed Feb. 12, 2007). 
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The rhetorical appeal for Google is probably that offline, 
if a given business fails to pay the Yellow Pages in order to 
appear within a commercial category where it “belongs,” trade-
mark law does not give that business cause of action.409 In the 
offline context, it seems that faulty indices have not raised 
issues of trademark law. 
Yet the Yellow Pages generally lists its customers under 
generic headings rather than by competitor trademarks. There 
are many other ways one might distinguish between what 
Google does with AdWords and what offline advertising 
companies do with their publications. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, it is a fact that in the online context faulty indices have 
been made a matter of trademark law. 
C. Trademark Law and the Internet Index 
Though trademark law has never been particularly 
relevant to offline indices, in the last ten years, courts have 
been utilizing trademark law aggressively in attempts to 
improve the quality of online indices.410 Ironically, this common 
law evolution has been rooted in trademark law and has been 
directed largely at obtaining the same goals that Professors 
Dogan and Lemley seek to achieve by promoting trademark 
use: a reduction in the search costs of consumers looking for 
information on the internet. 
These attempts by courts can be justly criticized in 
many ways. It cannot be debated, however, that courts have 
been attempting to police the shape of online indices by way of 
trademark law. The use of trademark law to supervise 
indexical integrity is truly a common-law evolution. It is a 
common-law evolution that subsequently found support and 
endorsement in a major legislative enactment amending 
trademark law. 
The interaction between trademarks and online indices 
began with domain names.411 Domain names were originally 
  
 409 For an interesting examination of the strategies that attorneys use in 
advertising in the Yellow Pages, see Daniel M. Filler, Lawyers in the Yellow Pages, 14 
CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 169 (2002). 
 410 This attempt is understandable since, as Professor Pasquale has explained 
in two recent articles, the information wealth of the Web creates a new demand for 
authoritative and responsible metadata. Pasquale, supra note 87, at 125-28, 158-59, 
178-82. 
 411 Goldman, supra note 67, at 543 (“Although the DNS has a different 
technical architecture and origin than search engines, the DNS has always functioned 
as a search tool.”). 
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awarded to registrants on a first-come, first-serve basis.412 In 
1994, individuals could register whatever domain names they 
wanted: a Wired journalist registered “mcdonalds.com” and 
wrote about the strangeness of the experience.413 Early 
speculators, sniffing out how these new index values were up 
for grabs, were soon busy grabbing up popular domain 
names.414 Perhaps the most well-known domain name dispute 
was over the ownership of “sex.com.” The domain name was 
originally acquired for free, yet it generated millions of dollars 
of income for the thief who stole it from the original 
registrant.415  
Though domain names were never intended to serve as 
a Web index, in the late 1990s, many courts believed (perhaps 
correctly) that many people treated them as such, attempting 
to find information on the Web by guessing at domain names.416 
Where domain names corresponded with trademarks, trade-
mark owners were understandably upset that “their” names 
were being freely appropriated by others. In a 1996 address, 
Judge Frank Easterbrook complained about the proliferation of 
practices with respect to domain names that he considered an 
“[a]ppropriation of names and trademarks.”417 Clearly, Judge 
Easterbrook had no misgivings about who the proper owners of 
domain names were. 
One early domain name case was Planned Parenthood 
v. Bucci, in which the defendant had registered the website 
“plannedparenthood.com” and used it to promote an anti-
abortion message.418 Planned Parenthood sued to prevent Bucci 
  
 412 Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 207, 212; Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private 
Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism In Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 
1298-306 (1998); Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 TEX. L. REV. 715, 723-
34 (2003). 
 413 Joshua Quittner, Billions Registered: Right Now There Are No Rules to 
Keep You from Owning a Bitchin’ Corporate Name as Your Own Internet Address, 
WIRED, Oct. 1994, at 50-51. 
 414 Margaret Jane Radin, A Comment on Information Propertization and Its 
Legal Milieu, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23, 31 (2006). 
 415 See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 416 See Sporty’s Farm v. Sportsman’s Mkt., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(“The most common method of locating an unknown domain is simply to type in the 
company name or logo with the suffix .com.”); Brookfield Commc’ns v. West Coast 
Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. 
Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997); Cardservice Int’l, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 741 (E.D. 
Va. 1997). 
 417 Easterbrook, supra note 412 at 212. 
 418 Bucci, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *2-5. 
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from using the domain name, alleging trademark infringement 
and dilution. It prevailed on both theories. From the standpoint 
of traditional trademark law principles, the Bucci opinion was 
innovative.419 Setting aside the question of how the site could 
have created confusion among consumers, it is not clear how 
Bucci had used the Planned Parenthood mark in commerce, 
given that he was not selling anything.420 Those who advocate 
for an expansion of trademark use often criticize Bucci for this 
reason.421 
The Bucci court found the defendant had used the plain-
tiff’s trademark in commerce, in part, because the registration 
of the domain name was designed to capture the social value of 
the domain’s indexical function: 
[D]efendant’s use of plaintiff’s mark is “in connection with the 
distribution of services” because it is likely to prevent some Internet 
users from reaching plaintiff’s own Internet web site. Prospective 
users of plaintiff’s services who mistakenly access defendant’s web 
site may fail to continue to search for plaintiff’s own home page, due 
to anger, frustration, or the belief that plaintiff’s home page does not 
exist.422 
Though the court spoke in the language of trademark 
law, the subtext of the opinion seemed to indicate that Bucci 
should be liable for trademark infringement largely because to 
hold otherwise would be to allow public anger and frustration 
with the indexical function of domain names to continue. Bucci 
was liable because his actions had caused the public to struggle 
with a faulty index. 
Later district and circuit courts developed this idea, 
regularly citing the “anger” and “frustration” language from 
Bucci in order to establish that the registration of domain 
  
 419  Or awful, or both, depending on your point of view. See Eric Goldman, 
Online Word of Mouth and Its Implications for Trademark Law (Santa Clara Univ. 
School of Law, Working Paper No. 07-46,. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1020695 (stating that Bucci represented “the zenith (nadir?) of use in commerce 
overreaching”). 
 420 The use of a trademark, while it need not be a “profit-seeking activity,” 
must be a commercial activity. See United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, 
Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 421 Barrett, supra note 371, at 405 (“To elevate an individual’s statement of 
his personal religious opinion to the level of a Lanham Act service goes well beyond any 
established precedent and threatens to bring a wide array of fully protected First 
Amendment speech under the control of trademark owners.”); Margreth Barrett, 
Domain Names, Trademarks and the First Amendment: Searching for Meaningful 
Boundaries, 39 CONN. L. REV. 973, 1024 (2007) (criticizing the decision); Widmaier, 
supra note 371, at 657-59 (criticizing the court’s reasoning). 
 422  Bucci, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *15. 
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names by those other than trademark holders amounted to a 
“use in commerce.”423 In one opinion citing Bucci, the Ninth 
Circuit took the concept even further. Rather than simply 
using the Bucci language to support a finding of “use in 
commerce,” the court provided a general statement about 
trademark dilution by registering a domain name: “[d]ilution 
occurs because prospective users of plaintiff’s services may fail 
to continue to search for plaintiff’s own home page, due to 
anger, frustration or the belief that plaintiff’s home page does 
not exist.”424 Trademark dilution was used as a kludge to 
improve the index. 
Another well-known corruptor of indexical value was 
Dennis Toeppen, who lost two of the earliest domain name 
cases in 1996 pursuant to trademark dilution theories.425 In one 
case, Toeppen registered the domain name “panavision.com” 
and used it to host views of Pana, Illinois.426 There was no 
evidence that any consumers had been confused about source 
or sponsorship as a result of Toeppen’s registration of the 
“panavision” domain, and, as in Bucci, it seemed a quite a 
stretch to say that Toeppen was using the Panavision 
trademark in commerce. Yet the California district court found 
Toeppen’s conduct was a commercial use (because he sought to 
sell the domain to Panavision) and constituted trademark 
dilution. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.  
In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit referenced the “anger” 
and “frustration” language from Bucci.427 Other parts of its 
opinion offered additional examples of how the harm was not 
seen merely as “theft” of the trademark owner’s value, but as a 
corruption of the value of the domain name system as an index:  
A domain name is the simplest way of locating a web site. If a 
computer user does not know a domain name, she can use an 
Internet “search engine.” To do this, the user types in a key word 
search, and the search will locate all of the web sites containing the 
key word. Such key word searches can yield hundreds of web sites. 
  
 423 See, e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs, Ltd., 286 F.3d 270, 275 (5th 
Cir. 2002); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 
2d 915, 919 (E.D. Va. 2000).  
 424 Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 880 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 425 See Panavision Int’l., L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996) 
(denying Toeppen’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction); Intermatic Inc. 
v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
 426 Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. at 619. 
 427 Panavision Int’l. L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(quoting Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 306-07 (D. N.J. 1998)). 
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To make it easier to find their web sites, individuals and companies 
prefer to have a recognizable domain name. 
. . . . 
Using a company’s name or trademark as a domain name is also the 
easiest way to locate that company’s web site. Use of a “search 
engine” can turn up hundreds of web sites, and there is nothing 
equivalent to a phone book or directory assistance for the Internet.428  
That the Ninth Circuit thought Toeppen interfered with this 
process was clear. It stated that Toeppen’s “‘business’ is to 
register trademarks as domain names and then sell them to 
the rightful trademark owners.”429 Implicit here is the notion 
that it would be “rightful” for Panavision to own the domain 
name. This would be congruent with the belief that the domain 
name system should operate as a socially useful index of 
information. When people go to Panavision.com, in other 
words, they should be able to find the company they were 
seeking—not a picture of Pana, Illinois. 
Trademark infringement and dilution were used by 
courts to remedy what they perceived as social harms to the 
value of indices created by abuses of the laissez faire system of 
domain name distribution. Findings of trademark dilution and 
infringement were premised on the belief that cybersquatting 
had little social utility. Courts found the speculative pur-
chasing and reselling of domain names for indexical value 
created significant harms to trademark owners and to Internet 
users, while creating no cognizable benefits to society. And this 
idea was not entirely inconsistent with trademark law. Policing 
domain name registration under the rubric of trademark law 
prohibited what was seen as unfair competition and reduced 
search costs incurred by consumers using domain names as 
information indices. 
Early judicial innovations in this area were later legis-
latively endorsed and superseded by specific amendments to 
the federal trademark law. The Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act (“ACPA”), passed in 1999, codified decisions like 
Bucci and Panavision in a new section of the Lanham Act.430 
The ACPA prohibits registration of domain names in “bad 
  
 428 Toeppen, 141 F.3d at 1319, 1327.  
 429 Id. at 1325. 
 430 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3002(a), 
113 Stat. 1501A-28, 1501A-545 to -548 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000)) 
(effectively providing a new cause of action for cybersquatting claims, generally 
sounding in trademark and placed within the trademark statutes).  
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faith;” for example, an intention to merely resell them to 
trademark owners for a profit.431 Some commentators have 
characterized the ACPA as an ill-considered grant of property 
rights to trademark holders.432 While the current law is hardly 
perfect, it might be defended as an attempt by Congress to 
improve the social utility of the domain name system as a Web 
index. 
Today we live in a time when domain names have 
diminishing public utility as an Internet index. The new index 
is Google. In the ten years since Bucci and Panavision were 
decided, and the eight years since the passage of the ACPA, 
search engines have improved to the point where the factual 
characterizations of them in earlier opinions is wholly inac-
curate.433 Rather than being inferior to domain names as an 
index, search engines have effectively replaced the domain 
name system. Domain name guessing is not the norm and 
makes little sense.434 Google did not exist when Bucci and 
Panavision were being litigated, but today most people turn to 
Google rather than guessing randomly at possible domain 
names. This is eminently rational, as Google is much more 
likely than the domain name system to provide the desired 
result.435 
  
 431 See Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 270 (4th 
Cir. 2001) (applying the ACPA and finding bad faith on the part of the domain name 
registrants). 
 432 See, e.g., Radin, supra note 414, at 32. 
If courts had explicitly referred to competition policy and free speech policy in 
these cases, we might have gotten better reasoned decisions, with more 
explicit consideration of competing free speech policies in the case of parody 
and protest sites, more explicit consideration of the needs of competitors of 
the plaintiff, and some exploration of the baseline question of who initially 
owns this new asset . . . . [I]t would have been better for the issue to have 
gotten the thorough analysis it deserved. 
Id. 
 433 See Goldman, supra note 67, at 548 (noting how some of the most popular 
search engine queries are for terms where the searcher is obviously aware of the 
domain names, e.g., “www.yahoo.com” and “www.hotmail.com”). 
 434 See Ned Snow, The Constitutional Failing of the Anticybersquatting Act, 41 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 76 (2005) (“[R]ather than guessing the trademark holder’s 
domain name, consumers identify the mark holder’s website through a search engine. 
Therefore, the alleged problem giving rise to the first governmental interest appears 
nonextant.”); Ben Edelman, DNS as a Search Engine: A Quantitative Evaluation 
(2002), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/DNS-as-search/ (last visited Sept. 
1, 2007) (concluding that in 2002, Google provided a much more effective directory to 
brand names than the DNS). 
 435 Edelman, supra note 434. 
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With the movement from domain names to search 
engines, courts lost none of their solicitude for protecting the 
social value of useful Web indices. This concern continues to be 
expressed under the rubric of trademark law. The meta tag 
cases discussed above demonstrate how courts continued to 
incorporate concerns about the social utility of online indices in 
their efforts to apply trademark law to search engines.  
Though competitor meta tag cases like Brookfield 
strained the limits of trademark law’s internal coherence, they 
were motivated by a noble, if misapplied, sentiment. Meta tag 
“abusers” were understood by courts as the new incarnation of 
domain name cybersquatters. The use of competitor trade-
marks in meta tags, pursuant to the Brookfield signpost 
analogy, was not really about wasting the time of the search 
engine user. Indeed, the only way Brookfield makes sense 
under a bait-and-switch theory is when it is the search engine’s 
index that is being deceived. The index, as a proxy for the 
consumer’s interests, was being protected. Meta tags, being 
“invisible,” could not deceive users, but they could deceive 
search engines into awarding websites an undeserved high 
ranking. Rulings preventing meta tag abuses were therefore 
seen (generally incorrectly) as vindicating the interests of 
search engine users.  
This principle can be seen best when courts refused to 
find infringement liability. The defendants in Faber and Welles 
prevailed only because courts found they did not corrupt the 
value of the search engine’s index.436 Users seeking information 
about “bally” might benefit from finding the type of criticism 
Faber offered. Those seeking “playboy” might be interested  
in finding the website of Welles, a former Playboy model. In  
the Netscape district court opinion, the court seemed primarily 
concerned that Playboy’s assertion of trademark rights 
threatened the utility of search engines as indices.437 
In Welles, one cautionary note by the Ninth Circuit is 
also important to observe: “our decision might differ if . . . 
Welles’ site would regularly appear above PEI’s in searches for 
one of the trademarked terms.”438 Here the Ninth Circuit 
seemed to be suggesting trademark could provide an index 
policy attuned to relevance-ranked listings. Welles was granted 
  
 436 Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 804 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 437 Netscape I, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
 438 Welles, 279 F.3d at 804. 
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the right to be included in search results, but it was a different 
question whether she could appear more prominently than the 
Playboy site. 
There are dangers in granting trademark this much 
power. Trademark law cannot describe an optimal index to the 
Internet, given the fact that much of the information users 
seek and the problems they encounter are not matters where 
trademark law has much application. As explained above with 
regard to initial interest confusion, allowing trademark law to 
dominate the indexical value of search results poses serious 
risks: trademark meanings might usurp other understandings 
of terms.439 
Yet, by the same token, the precedent of the anti-
cybersquatting cases and the ACPA must have some relevance 
to the intersection of trademark law and search engine results. 
Allowing Google to completely control the indexical function of 
its search results might lead to public harms. I believe Google’s 
practices are defensible today. Google does not provide an ideal 
index of the Web, but it does not currently seem to be acting in 
ways that generally frustrate the public’s interest in finding 
useful information or are intended to do that. Indeed, for most 
users, Google remains an incredible and essential tool. It is 
true that Google seems somewhat biased toward commercial 
and popular results (and that the mythological figure Nike has 
seemingly lost her symbolic capital in the online environment). 
Yet trademark law is ill adapted to fix this problem.  
The reason trademark law must stay engaged with 
Google is quite simple. No matter how we feel about the 
company today, it is possible, perhaps even likely, that some 
day Google (or another major search engine) will pursue profits 
in such a way that threatens the interests of trademark owners 
and threatens the public indexical interest. Market discipline 
may prevent this result, but it might not. It is hard to predict 
what shape future abuses might take, but this is why judicial 
intervention in advance of a legislative solution might be 
justified, as it was in the Panavision case. Indeed, the mere 
knowledge that trademark law stands ready to curb abusive 
index practices may have an ameliorative effect on the com-
mercial conduct of Google and other search engines. 
  
 439 Cf. Dinwoodie & Janis, Contextualism, supra note 70, at 1639 (explaining 
trademark may need to adapt if it is used as a “principle tool of information policy”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Google currently occupies a central role in online 
commerce and information retrieval. It operates as an online 
index, connecting the public to information about where to find 
people, places, products, and knowledge. Google was right 
when it once claimed that advertising-funded search engines 
are “inherently biased towards the advertisers and away from 
the needs of the consumers.”440 Today it seeks to “marry user 
experience to the information that advertisers want to 
communicate.”441 
Google’s power over search results has vast commercial 
significance that is in many ways unprecedented in society. 
Google also generates substantial wealth as a result of this 
power. One of the few areas of law that seems to retain some 
supervisory control over Google’s conduct is trademark law. 
It is important that courts retain the power of trade-
mark law to police Google, but it is equally important that they 
understand the limitations of trademark law in policing search 
results. Trademark law has so far failed in many ways to 
appropriately police search results by failing to hew to its 
historical purposes, failing to recognize the difference between 
indexical and spatial orderings, and failing to recognize its own 
inherent limitations as a tool for improving indices.  
Yet the law in this area is still young. Courts have only 
had ten years to consider these issues. As their experience 
grows and the online marketplace continues to develop, the 
judiciary may eventually find better ways to protect the public 
interest in search engine results. Courts of the future may  
play a much more important and constructive role in shaping 
Google’s Law.  
  
 440 Brin & Page, supra note 1. 
 441 Google Q3 2006 Earnings Call Transcript, supra note 2. 
